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In October 2009, I had my first day as an intern at the Oslocenter for Peace and 
Human Rights. I had never had a job that was directly linked to my studies and I was 
extremely nervous on my first day. That first morning at the Oslocenter Alf Åge 
Hansen, Special Advisor for Human Rights, sat at the coffee table and we started 
talking. He asked what I was interested in and I told him about my fascination for and 
my interest in political development in Africa. Alf Åge Hansen had himself worked at 
the Norwegian Embassy in Ethiopia and now he was responsible for the Oslocenter’s 
new human rights report on Eritrea. He told me that the report was the most important 
project at that time and that they were in process of trying to meet with UN and EU 
officials where they would share their findings. I knew nothing about Eritrea. Hansen 
said that I had to become familiar with the report, as I probably would get some tasks 
relating to it. I spent the next six hours reading and was introduced to a totalitarian 
country that was only 16 years old. After reading the report I wanted to know more. I 





In 1993, Eritrea achieved de jure independence and was perceived by the 
international community and the Eritrean population as Africa’s new hope as the 
leadership projected a rhetoric of multi-party elections, socio-economic development 
and human rights. Today, the country is one of the worst human rights violators, there 
is only one party allowed, and dissenters are thrown into prison and tortured without 
due process. The thesis attempts to answer the research question: why has Eritrea 
failed to democratise? It thoroughly goes through the dominant democratisation 
theories and uses an eclectic theory based on historical sociology, transition theory and 
post-conflict democratisation theory. It creates an alternative framework with the state, 
society and external relations as three analytical dimensions. The thesis concludes with 
stating that all three dimensions have contributed to the failure of democratisation in 
Eritrea and that it is only possible to understand how they have contributed by looking 
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The EPLF has already underlined its commitment to create a multi-party system in 
Eritrea. A one-party system will neither enhance national security or stability nor 
accelerate economic development. In fact a one party system could be a major threat to 
the very existence of our country. For these reasons we will have to avoid these 
malaises in tomorrow’s Eritrea. 
(Isaias Afwerki, Secretary-general of the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front, October 1990)1 
 
We will wait for about 3-4 decades [before introducing multi-party elections] until we 
see genuine natural situations have emerged in Eritrea. 
(Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki in an interview with Riz Khan, 
AlJazeera, 22 May 2008)2 
  
 
In 1993, Eritrea achieved independence and was perceived by the international 
community and the Eritrean population as Africa’s new hope as the leadership 
projected a rhetoric of multi-party elections, socio-economic development and human 
rights. Today, the country is one of the worst human rights violators, there is only one 
party allowed, and dissenters are thrown into prison and tortured without due process.3 
The current call for democracy in North Africa is the newest occurrence in a long 
history of democratisation in Africa. The first democratic elections in Africa were in 
the 1950s and 1960s, but shortly after, many African states moved towards one-party 
rule or authoritarian takeovers of government. Many were therefore extremely positive 
in the 1990s when new governments took power in states like Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
After the Cold War, observers of world politics became convinced that they were 
witnessing a new era in global politics: a third wave of democratisation4. African states 
in the beginning of 1990s were a part of this third wave and as a result received much 
                                                 
1	  Cited	  in	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  Eritrea:	  A	  Dream	  Deferred,	  Suffolk:	  James	  Currey,	  p.	  146	  
2	  Riz	  Khan	  –	  Isaias	  Afwerki	  –	  22	  May	  09,	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UAXKsZ8OsWo	  (08:54),	  accessed	  
on	  27	  April	  2011	  
3	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  The	  Lasting	  Struggle	  for	  Freedom	  in	  Eritrea:	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Political	  Development,	  
1991-­‐2009,	  Haugesund:	  HBO	  AS	  
4	  Huntington,	  Samuel	  P.	  (1991)	  The	  Third	  Wave:	  Democratisation	  in	  the	  Late	  Twentieth	  Century,	  Norman:	  
University	  of	  Oklahoma	  Press	  
 3 
support and praise from the international community. The US President Bill Clinton 
characterised Eritrea, together with Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda, as the ‘African 
renaissance’.5 With talk of democracy and economic development, the President of the 
transitional government in Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki,6 created optimism that Eritrea 
would symbolise a new democratic Africa.  
After a 30-year long liberation war against Ethiopia, most of the country was in 
ruins in 1993. Nevertheless, according to Tronvoll, the Eritrean people strongly 
believed in a more prosperous future, as the Liberation Front established the first 
civilian government and appointed its leader, Isaias, as President of independent 
Eritrea. “The absolute majority of the population looked upon the liberation front with 
great esteem and admiration, as they had struggled and endured hardships and great 
sacrifices for the common good of the people.”7 The leadership of the Liberation Front 
was at that time viewed as a new kind of African leaders: they enjoyed popular 
support, they spoke highly of liberal democracy, human rights and a free market 
economy, and they had a well-defined development policy based on their own 
priorities.8 Furthermore, Eritrea started with a clean slate in form of no foreign debt, 
low inflation and zero tolerance for corruption.9 They received an unconditional 
support from the international community and newspaper articles from the beginning 
of 1990s are full with accounts of USAID/EU delegations, ascension to multilateral 
agencies, demobilisation and resettlement programs and food security initiatives.10 
Needless to say, as the second quote above highlights, even though Eritrea was 
part of the third wave of democratisation, democracy is yet to be realised in present 
Eritrea. The aspirations and hopes for democracy and respect for human rights, as 
expressed at the time of independence, are today only bleak memories. Eritrea’s 
democratisation process has not only stagnated, it has reversed. Since coming to power 
                                                 
5	  Connell,	  Dan	  (2009a)	  ‘Eritrea	  and	  the	  United	  States:	  towards	  a	  new	  US	  policy’	  in	  Richard	  Reid	  (ed.)	  Eritrea’s	  
External	  Relations:	  Understanding	  its	  regional	  role	  and	  foreign	  policy,	  London:	  Chatham	  House	  p.	  136	  
6	  Eritreans	  (and	  Ethiopians)	  go	  by	  first	  names	  and	  do	  not	  use	  inherited	  surnames.	  Thus	  when	  referring	  to	  
Eritrea’s	  president	  Isaias	  Afwerki,	  this	  study	  will	  only	  use	  Isaias,	  or	  President	  Isaias.	  
7	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  p.	  18	  
8	  Ibid.	  
9	  Cameron,	  Greg	  (2009)	  ‘The	  Eritrean	  State	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective’	  in	  David	  O’Kane	  and	  Tricia	  Redeker	  
Hepner	  (eds.)	  Biopolitics,	  militarism,	  and	  development:	  Eritrea	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  New	  York:	  Berghahn	  
Books,	  p.	  141	  
10	  ibid.	  p.	  142	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in 1991, the government party, EPLF/PFDJ11 has managed to push Eritrea into armed 
conflicts with Sudan, Djibouti, and Yemen and waged the biggest and most 
devastating bilateral war on the continent in recent decades, with Ethiopia. They have 
sustained a total militarisation of society, suspended all independent and privately 
owned newspapers and magazines, closed down national and international 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), curtailed academic freedom, detained and 
tortured many thousands of ordinary Eritreans believed to be a threat to the regime’s 
survival, pushed hundred of thousands of Eritreans to flee their country as refugees 
and destroyed the state economy.12 The current regime in Eritrea has been described as 
one of the world’s most totalitarian regimes in regard to democratisation and human 
rights.13 Freedom House, when evaluating political and civil liberties ranked Eritrea in 
the category ‘worst of the worst’ when it comes to political and civil liberties, 
classifying it as ‘not free’ with the lowest score possible.14 Reporters Without Borders 
in their Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2010, ranks Eritrea as the worst country in 
the world ranking number 175 out of 175.15  
At the time of independence, few could predict today’s undemocratic regime in 
Eritrea. Being a part of the third wave of democratisation and endorsing liberal values 
were reasons for unconditional support from the international community towards 
Eritrea and its government. It is thus a puzzle that Eritrea today has no traces of 
upholding human rights and is not even close to introducing multi-party elections. 
Hence, this thesis’ research question: with such aspirations, potential and external 
support at the time of independence why has Eritrea failed to democratise?  
 
                                                 
11	  EPLF	  was	  renamed	  the	  People’s	  Front	  for	  Democracy	  and	  Justice	  (PFDJ)	  in	  1994.	  In	  this	  study	  EPLF	  will	  be	  
used	  when	  talking	  about	  the	  party	  pre-­‐1994	  and	  PFDJ	  post-­‐1994.	  When	  an	  issue	  concerns	  the	  party	  over	  a	  
longer	  period,	  or	  in	  general,	  the	  study	  will	  use	  EPLF/PFDJ	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  party	  
12	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  p.	  19	  
13	  Ibid.	  p.	  17	  
14	  Freedom	  House:	  Freedom	  in	  the	  World	  2010,	  
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7819,	  accessed	  on	  20	  April,	  2011	  
15	  Reporters	  without	  Borders,	  http://en.rsf.org/press-­‐freedom-­‐index-­‐2010,1034.html,	  accessed	  on	  20	  April,	  
2011	  
 5 
1.1 Historical backdrop 
Eritrea in its present shape dates from 1890 when the various territories 
possessed by Italy on the western shore of the Red Sea were united into a single 
colony, and its present frontiers were defined in a series of treaties concluded between 
1900 and 1908. As a result, the Eritrean territory, like most other African colonies, 
consisted of several ethnic groups. Today there are officially nine different ethnic 
groups in Eritrea: Tigrinya (50%), Tigre (31%), Saho (5%), Kunama (2%), Rashaida 
(2.4%), Bilen (2%), Afar (5%), Hedareb (2.5%) and Nara (1.5%).16 
After Italy’s defeat in World War II, Eritrea was put temporarily under British 
trusteeship while the Four Big Powers, the US, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and 
France, were to decide the destiny of ex-Italian colonial territories. When they failed to 
decide, the case was referred to the United Nations (UN) and Eritrea was federated 
with Ethiopia in 1952, under the sovereign rule of Emperor Haile Selaisse, in 
accordance with UN Resolution 390A passed on 2 December 1950.17 Repeated 
Ethiopian violations of the federal agreement, and the subsequent annexation of Eritrea 
as the country’s fourteenth province in 1962 triggered Eritrean armed resistance.18  
From 1961 to 1991, Eritrean ambitions to nationhood were manifested through 
armed struggle.  In 1961 emerged the Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrean 
Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF based its strategies on the methods used in Algeria 
by the National Liberation Front (AFLN). The ELF divided the Eritrean territory into 
several zones based on ethnic groups, which worked through patrimonial divisions of 
ethnic kinship and clan loyalties. Thus the zones divided the Front according to 
regional, religious, and ethnic differences.19 The commencement of the armed struggle 
displayed serious shortcomings of the ELF. It was, according to Bereketeab, 
characterised by ad hocism and impulsiveness, and the behaviour of the leadership was 
characterised by arbitrariness, personal rivalry and unfettered power accumulation on 
                                                 
16	  Planning	  Office,	  Ministry	  of	  Education,	  Asmara,	  Eritrea,	  1996,	  cited	  in	  Woldemikael,	  Tekle	  (2003)	  ‘Language,	  
education,	  and	  public	  policy	  in	  Eritrea’	  in	  African	  Studies	  Review,	  vol.	  46:	  117-­‐136,	  p.	  120	  
17	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  p.	  2	  
18	  Hepner,	  Tricia	  R.	  and	  O’Kane,	  David	  (2009a)	  ‘Biopolitics,	  Militarism,	  and	  Development	  in	  Contemporary	  
Eritrea’	  in	  David	  O’Kane	  and	  Tricia	  Redeker	  Hepner	  (eds.)	  Biopolitics,	  militarism,	  and	  development:	  Eritrea	  in	  
the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  New	  York:	  Berghahn	  Books,	  p.	  xix	  
19	  Iyob,	  Ruth	  (1995)	  The	  Eritrean	  Struggle	  for	  independence:	  Domination,	  resistance	  and	  nationalism,	  1941-­‐
1993,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	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individuals.20 Iyob notes however, that the ELF’s horizontal structure encouraged 
factionalism. “Such a […] system based on patronage affiliations with the leadership 
was bound not only to create conflicting loyalties […], but also to accentuate the 
ethno-religious divisions that demarcated the zones from one another.”21 In 1970, due 
to internal differences, a small faction of the ELF broke away and established its own 
competing liberation movement, the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF), which by 1975 
had taken the name of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). The 
conservative leadership of the ELF was challenged by the youthful and radical EPLF. 
The ELF viewed the EPLF as a threat and when the EPLF did not comply with the 
ELF’s ultimatum of rejoining or face the consequences, a full-blown civil war was 
waged between 1972 and 1974.22 
The first civil war between the Eritrean liberation fronts ended in a ceasefire in 
1974 as the two fronts agreed to coordinate their activities against the Ethiopian army. 
This ceasefire was not a permanent one and differences between the groups 
remained.23 The fronts again turned their energies towards each other, unleashing the 
second civil war (1980-1981). Internal disagreements and fighting between the ELF 
and the EPLF ended in 1982, when the ELF was driven off Eritrean soil and the EPLF 
could thus direct all its efforts against the Ethiopian Derg regime24. Additionally, this 
meant that the EPLF was the sole actor defining Eritrean resistance and could thus 
enforce its hegemony in Eritrea. With growing tensions within Ethiopia as a 
consequence of the military activities of the Ethiopian liberation movements, namely 
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the 
EPLF managed to throw out the last outposts on the country, liberating the capital 
Asmara on the 24th of May 1991.25 After the fall of the Mengistu regime in May 1991, 
the TPLF-led coalition resistance movement, Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
                                                 
20	  Bereketeab,	  Redie	  (2007)	  ‘When	  Success	  Becomes	  a	  Liability:	  Challenges	  of	  State	  Building	  in	  Eritrea	  (1991-­‐
2005)’	  in	  African	  and	  Asian	  Studies,	  vol.	  6:	  395-­‐430,	  p.	  402	  
21	  Iyob,	  Ruth	  (1995)	  p.	  112	  
22	  Bereketeab	  (2007)	  pp.	  403-­‐404	  and	  Iyob,	  Ruth	  (1995)	  p.	  116	  
23	  Iyob,	  Ruth	  (1995)	  pp.	  118-­‐121	  
24	  The	  Derg	  regime	  was	  a	  communist	  military	  junta	  that	  came	  to	  power	  in	  Ethiopia	  following	  the	  ousting	  of	  
Haile	  Selassie	  I	  in	  1974.	  Mengistu	  Haile	  Mariam	  was	  the	  leader	  and	  in	  this	  thesis	  the	  Derg	  and	  Mengistu	  regime	  
are	  used	  interchangeably	  
25	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (1999)	  ‘Borders	  of	  violence	  –	  boundaries	  of	  identity:	  demarcating	  the	  Eritrean	  nation-­‐state’	  in	  
Ethnic	  and	  Racial	  Studies,vol.	  22:6,	  p.	  1043	  
 7 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), took power in Ethiopia. Simultaneously the EPLF 
proclaimed a two-year transitional period, which would end in a referendum on 
independence. In April 1993 the Eritreans went to the polls and voted overwhelmingly 
in favour of independence. On the 24th of May 1993 the EPLF declared Eritrea as an 
independent sovereign state.26 
Outwardly friendly relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia for much of the 
1990s, however masked deeper tensions between the respective governments. 
Economic agreements and suggestions of ever-closer political and strategic 
collaboration hid escalating tensions over boundaries, commercial rivalries, 
ideological differences and the quest for being the regional hegemon.27 In May 1998 
an exchange of fire in the contested area of Badme swiftly led to a full-scale war. The 
war ceased in June 2000, and was formally ended by the Algiers Treaty of 12 
December 2000.28 In 2001, a group of top-level military and leaders (G-15) from the 
People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), EPLF’s new name as of 1994, 
questioned Eritrea’s president. In an open letter, G-15 questioned what they perceived 
as an authoritarian development in Eritrea and accused President Isaias of acting 
without restraint, even illegally. 29 In the letter they wrote that “the problem is that the 
president is conducting himself in an illegal and unconstitutional manner, is refusing to 
consult, and the legislative and executive bodies have not performed their oversight 
functions properly.”30 In response to a growing dissent in Eritrea, President Isaias 
mobilised a large-scale crackdown in September 2001, arresting dissenters, including 
the G-15, shutting down all private media and the nascent civil society was closed 
down. Since then, the PFDJ has assumed total control, mobilising all Eritreans 
between 18 and 40 in the national service programme, prohibiting all forms of 
alternative opinions, failing to implement the constitution and postponing elections. 
                                                 
26	  Ibid.	  p.	  1044	  
27	  Negash,	  Tekeste	  &	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2000)	  Brothers	  at	  War:	  Making	  Sense	  of	  the	  Eritrean-­‐Ethiopian	  War,	  
Oxford:	  James	  Currey	  
28	  Reid,	  Richard	  (2009a)	  ‘Introduction’	  in	  Richard	  Reid	  (ed.)	  Eritrea’s	  External	  Relations:	  Understanding	  its	  
regional	  role	  and	  foreign	  policy,	  London:	  Chatham	  House	  
29	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  pp.	  64-­‐65	  
30	  G-­‐15	  letter	  cited	  in	  Tronvoll	  (2009)	  p.	  65	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1.2 Form of government – definitions 
 This study attempts to answer the research question why has Eritrea failed to 
democratise? It will thus analyse the period from independence to the present. 
Democracy is defined as popular control over public affairs on the basis of political 
equality. In addition, democracy is characterised by the qualities of participation, 
authorisation, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and 
solidarity.31 Democratisation is thus defined as processes and decisions taken in order 
to achieve democracy. Democracy is not perceived as a teleological concept, but rather 
a dynamic form of government where processes and decisions are taken constantly to 
improve the abovementioned definition of democracy. In other words, democratisation 
is something that begins when decision-makers make the choice of moving a state 
towards democracy, but which does not end when democracy is officially achieved. 
 It must be noted that there is a difference in this thesis’ definition of democracy 
and the Eritrean government’s idea of democracy. The abovementioned definition of 
democracy is a definition of liberal democracy. The vocabulary of democracy as used 
by EPLF/PFDJ during the struggle and after independence implied a Marxist-Leninist 
understanding of the term.32 Inherent in this understanding is the concept of 
democratic centralism where a vanguard would make the key decisions. The people 
cannot be trusted to rule themselves and what is needed is a ‘guided democracy’ where 
an enlightened few would decide for the people.33 Furthermore, the EPLF/PFDJ’s 
‘National Charter for Eritrea: For a Democratic, Just and Prosperous Future’, adopted 
in 1994, states that democracy: “is dependent not on the number of political parties 
and on regular elections but on the actual participation of people in the decision 
making process at community and national level.”34 Their understanding of democracy 
is thus that the EPLF/PFDJ represent the masses and will make the decisions, with the 
                                                 
31	  Törnquist,	  Olle	  (2004)	  ‘The	  Political	  Deficit	  of	  Substantial	  Democratisation’	  in	  John	  Harriss,	  Kristian	  Stokke	  
and	  Olle	  Törnquist	  (eds.)	  Politicising	  Democracy:	  The	  New	  Local	  Politics	  of	  Democratisation,	  Houndmills:	  
Palgrave,	  p.	  201	  
32	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  p.	  50	  
33	  Connell,	  Dan	  (2005a)	  ‘Redeeming	  the	  failed	  promise	  of	  democracy	  in	  Eritrea’	  in	  Race	  &	  Class,	  vol.	  46:	  4,	  	  p.	  74	  
34	  EPLF,	  A	  National	  Charter	  for	  Eritrea,	  For	  a	  Democratic,	  Just	  and	  Prosperous	  and	  Prosperous	  Future,	  Nacfa,	  
February,	  1994,	  cited	  in	  Tronvoll	  (2009)	  p.	  50	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citizens participating under the condition that they follow EPLF/PFDJ ideas and 
policies. 
As this chapter asks why Eritrea has failed to democratise, it is thus helpful to 
establish what type of regime the country is today. Linz considers a system totalitarian 
when certain characteristics exist: First, there is monistic centre of power, and 
whatever pluralism of institutions or groups exist, they derive their legitimacy from 
that centre and are largely mediated by it. Second, there is an exclusive, autonomous, 
ideology with which the ruling group and the party serving the leaders recognise and 
affiliate, which they use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimise them. The 
ideology goes beyond a specific program or definition of the boundaries of legitimate 
political action. It works to supply some ultimate meaning, sense of historical purpose, 
and interpretation of social reality. Third, citizen participation in, and active 
mobilisation for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, 
rewarded and channelled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary 
groups. Finally, in each realm of life for each purpose, there is only one feasible 
channel for participation, and the overall rationale and direction is set by one centre, 
which defines the legitimate goals of those organisations and ultimately controls 
them.35 
In Eritrea, President Isaias is the ultimate leader. All groups, institutions and 
organisations are to a large extent controlled, mediated or supported by him and a few 
selected advisors.36 Moreover, the PFDJ’s core value is national unity, placing it above 
anything else. Following the ideology of creating an Eritrean nation-state devoid of 
sectarian presence is thus the prime goal of the government. It gives some ultimate 
meaning and a sense of historical purpose.37 All types of participation in and active 
mobilisation for political and collective social tasks are channelled through the PFDJ, 
its mass organisations and the national service programme, which is compulsory for all 
citizens between 18-40.38 This is also the only possible channel for participation and 
                                                 
35	  Linz,	  Juan	  (2000)	  Totalitarian	  and	  Authoritarian	  Regimes,	  London:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  pp.	  70-­‐71	  
36	  Connell,	  Dan	  (2005a)	  
37	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  pp.	  206-­‐221	  
38	  See	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (2009)	  Service	  for	  Life:	  State	  Repression	  and	  Indefinite	  Conscription	  in	  Eritrea,	  New	  
York:	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	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the president and his advisors set the direction. While many of these elements will be 
touched upon throughout this thesis, this brief section serves to show that Eritrea is to 
be considered a totalitarian state. 
  
1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Research design 
A democratisation process is perceived as a complex phenomenon involving 
many actors as well as structural factors like war, stability, external influences and 
cultural elements. Hence, in order to understand and research the complexities of the 
failed democratisation in Eritrea, this thesis will use a qualitative research approach. 
This allows the research to go further in depth and highlight the wide range of factors 
contributing to the case at hand. According to Yin, in order to analyse and understand 
a complex social phenomenon a case study is preferred.39 Hence, this study will 
analyse the failed democratisation in Eritrea as a case study. This allows the researcher 
to devote all focus to Eritrea and to go deeper into the research material in order to 
answer the research question posed. These factors would be limited in for instance a 
comparative research design. Moreover, regarding this thesis’ research question, the 
use of case studies is suitable when looking to answer the ‘why’ question in a 
contemporary context.40 However, Yin points out that generalisation of results, from 
either single or multiple case studies, is made to theory and not to populations. 41 In 
other words, regarding the potential for drawing general conclusions, statistical studies 
are better. Single cases can confirm a theory or work as a falsification of a 
generalisation. A single case study is not a strong approach if one wants to generalise a 
population, in this case failed democratisation in general. This is important for the 
researcher to keep in mind when drawing conclusions about Eritrea. 
Good in-depth qualitative research requires a wider approach to the complex 
issue at hand. This thesis will thus adopt an eclectic theory of democratisation to 
                                                 
39	  Yin,	  Robert	  K.	  (2003)	  “Case	  Study	  research.	  Design	  and	  Methods,	  3rd	  edition”,	  in	  Applied	  Social	  Research	  
Methods	  Series,	  vol.	  5.	  Sage	  Publications	  Inc,	  p.	  2	  
40	  Yin	  (2003)	  
41	  Yin,	  Robert	  K.	  (1994)	  Case	  Study	  research:	  Design	  and	  methods	  (2nd	  edition),	  Beverly	  Hills:	  Sage	  Publications,	  
p.	  10	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analyse how three different factors contributed to the failure of democratisation in 
Eritrea. The three factors are the state, society and external relations. Former analyses 
of Eritrea often incorporate a certain idea to explain the current situation. In such a 
complex case as Eritrea however, one theory is not sufficient. Grugel argues that on its 
own, no single theory will completely explain a particular case, but they are useful in 
that they ask important questions and contribute to particular explanations.42 This 
thesis will thus thoroughly analyse different democratisation theories and attempt to 
incorporate different theories into an eclectic framework. As a result, the thesis will 
manage to analyse the failed democratisation in Eritrea more comprehensively.  
1.3.2 Research Methods 
It is, according to many scholars, extremely difficult to undertake independent 
critical research in Eritrea.43 No official research permits are granted to independent 
researchers, and certainly not for the study of political development.44 The extensive 
security and intelligence surveillance in Eritrea prohibits and impedes any gathering of 
information on what has gone wrong in Eritrea, without jeopardising the life and 
wellbeing of any informant. Furthermore, if one should persuade someone to talk, the 
information given may solely be the result of government propaganda and thus prove 
unreliable. Even Eritrean citizens are not allowed to undertake research activities 
without research permits.45 
Field research is therefore not a useful method to gather primary information 
concerning political development in Eritrea. Furthermore, as it is next to impossible to 
get interviews with government representatives, this research relies on official 
statements of the government, from other government sources such as official Eritrean 
websites and government-controlled media. In this case it is also important that one 
take into account that the information offered by the government is not necessarily 
correct as it has a need to be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of its citizens. All this 
                                                 
42	  Grugel,	  Jean	  (2002)	  Democratization:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction,	  Houndmills:	  Palgrave,	  p.	  46	  
43	  See	  for	  instance,	  Reid,	  Richard	  (2009b)	  ‘The	  Politics	  of	  Silence:	  Interpreting	  Stasis	  in	  Contemporary	  Eritrea’	  in	  
Review	  of	  African	  Political	  Economy,	  vol.	  36:	  120,	  p.	  210,	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  p.	  10,	  and	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  
p.	  16	  
44	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  p.	  16	  
45	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  p.	  10	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is clearly a methodological constraint when analysing the political development in 
Eritrea. It is therefore vital that these types of primary information be crosschecked in 
order to ensure reliability and validity. These kinds of sources will mainly be used to 
identify government’s opinions and views on issues rather than facts. In addition, the 
former Norwegian ambassador to Eritrea, Arman Aardal has through a long 
conversation with the author shared his opinions and experiences from his time in the 
country. This information has been used as complimentary to the research conducted 
and his opinions are omitted when they are not found in academic literature.  
The lack of primary sources in form of interviews, one could argue, is a 
weakness of this research. However, there are two major reasons why it has not been 
included. First, the question of Eritrea is a very sensitive issue amongst the Eritrean 
diaspora in Norway, and receiving objective information on political development in 
Eritrea is thus hard to come by. A wide range of Eritreans the author has been in 
contact with are loyal to the President and do not recognise any faults with Eritrea. At 
the same time, Eritreans opposing the regime are either too afraid to talk or blame 
everything on the government. Interviews would therefore demand an amount of work 
that does not fit into this thesis’ time limitations. Second, due to time and financial 
limitations it has not been possible to travel abroad to visit either government officials 
or larger diaspora communities. Also, for the same reasons, the author has chosen not 
to conduct interviews with researchers or NGO workers with experience from Eritrea.  
Consequently, the research conducted relies first and foremost on literature, 
either through anthropological studies or other secondary academic research. In other 
words, the researcher has collected, compared and analysed existing texts as well as 
re-analysed existing data from other investigations. There is an extensive amount of 
literature on Eritrea, so no shortage of information exists.  
When it comes to literature concerning Eritrea, there are two challenges that 
need to be highlighted: The first is a lack of objectivity. Dorman argues that “foreign 
journalists and academics have played almost as important a role in narrating, 
documenting, and advancing the nationalist agenda as the Eritrean fighters 
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themselves.”46 Gilkes writes that a “surprising number of eminent scholars and 
journalists have taken […] the EPLF at its own evaluation and its historical claims as 
facts”.47 Secondary literature concerning Eritrea can thus be influenced by 
misconceptions and biases. It should be noted that some of the sources used here are 
from authors who have been visiting the EPLF and supported them during the 
liberation struggle or have in fact participated in the liberation struggle. Dan Connell 
visited the EPLF during the liberation struggles on several occasions and supported 
EPLF’s cause. However, today Connell’s praises have turned into disappointment, 
illustrated by his article ‘Enough!’48 This change is worth bearing in mind as it can 
reflect his ability to objectively analyse the situation in Eritrea. Another scholar, 
Bereketeab, notes that his background and participation in the Eritrean liberation 
movement may give his work a certain biased perspective.49 Furthermore, due to the 
difficulties of doing fieldwork in Eritrea, many rely on previous fieldwork and 
interviews, as well as other secondary literature. The challenge, due to lack of updated 
information, is thus that secondary literature can reproduce misconceptions and biases. 
Due to the lack of primary sources, it is thus important to be critical to the secondary 
literature and use more than one source if necessary. This is particularly important 
when it comes to the interpretations of the liberation war. In addition, this thesis has 
tried to emphasise when using the EPLF/PFDJ’s interpretations of events in order to 
separate facts from interpretations. 
The second is finding sufficient information concerning political developments. 
As both time and finances are limited, most research will be conducted using libraries 
and other sources of information that can be accessed without having to travel too far. 
It is thus important to get relevant sources and use them effectively to obtain sufficient 
information. There are always obstacles or limitations present when conducting 
research. Access to information, access to correct information and an appropriate 
                                                 
46	  Dorman,	  Sara	  R.	  (2005)	  ‘Narratives	  of	  Nationalism	  in	  Eritrea:	  Research	  and	  revisionism’	  in	  Nations	  and	  
Nationalism,	  vol.	  11:	  2,	  pp.	  203-­‐222	  
47	  Gilkes	  (1991)	  p.	  626,	  cited	  in	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (1998a)	  Mai	  Weini,	  a	  highland	  village	  in	  Eritrea:	  a	  study	  of	  the	  
people,	  their	  livelihood	  and	  land	  tenure	  during	  times	  of	  turbulence,	  Lawrenceville:	  The	  Red	  Sea	  Press,	  	  	  p.	  8	  
48	  Connell,	  Dan	  (2003)	  ‘Enough!	  A	  Critique	  of	  Eritrea’s	  Post-­‐Liberation	  Politics’,	  found	  at	  
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200311060876.html,	  accessed	  on	  10	  March	  2011	  
49	  Bereketeab,	  Redie	  (2000)	  Eritrea:	  The	  making	  of	  a	  nation	  1890-­‐1991,	  Uppsala:	  ReproEkonomikum,	  p.	  30	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theoretical framework are some important limitations to recognise. As a researcher, the 
goal is always to create a fine product by setting the standards in the research design 
and by critically analysing sources so that certain influences do not foul the 
conclusion. 
  
1.3.3 Existing Literature 
Most relevant literature deals with the current state of affairs in Eritrea today. 
There are many different explanations given for this, ranging from biopolitics, the 
liberation war, to regional insecurity.50 For the most part, the academic literature 
analyses the government to explain either the state development, human rights issues 
or external relations.51 While this perspective is relevant and significant, this type of 
perspective tends to neglect other factors like civil society, the society as a whole and 
the international context. Furthermore, when doing an analysis of political 
development, the assumption that the state is fully responsible for the development is 
misleading. It is misleading in the sense that the state always functions in relationship 
to the wider society. Nevertheless, the academic literature on the Eritrean state is 
comprehensive and the majority points to the liberation war to explain the political 
development.52  
 There are also studies, which have been done on Eritrean citizens, villages and 
ethnic groups.53 These studies point to another relevant aspect of Eritrea, namely the 
citizens. The accounts give a clearer picture on how communities act and react to state 
                                                 
50	  See	  for	  instance:	  O’Kane,	  David	  and	  Hepner,	  Tricia	  R.	  (eds.)	  (2009)	  Biopolitics,	  militarism,	  and	  development:	  
Eritrea	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  New	  York:	  Berghahn	  Books,	  Pool	  David	  (2001)	  From	  Guerillas	  to	  Government:	  
The	  Eritrean	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front,	  Oxford:	  James	  Currey	  and	  Lyons,	  Terrence	  (2009)	  ‘The	  Ethiopia-­‐Eritrea	  
Conflict	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  Peace	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa’	  in	  Review	  of	  African	  Political	  Economy,	  vol.	  36:	  120,	  pp.	  
167-­‐180	  
51	  See	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a),	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  and	  Mengisteab,	  Kidane	  (2009)	  ‘What	  has	  gone	  wrong	  with	  
Eritrea’s	  foreign	  relations’	  in	  Richard	  Reid	  (ed.)	  Eritrea’s	  External	  Relations:	  Understanding	  its	  regional	  role	  and	  
foreign	  policy,	  London:	  Chatham	  House	  
52	  See	  Pool,	  David	  (2001),	  Hebru,	  Debessay	  (2003)	  ‘Eritrea:	  Transition	  to	  Dictatorship,	  1991-­‐2003’	  in	  Review	  of	  
African	  Political	  Economy,	  vol.	  30:	  97,	  pp.	  435-­‐444,	  Cliffe,	  Lionel	  (2008)	  ‘Eritrea	  2008:	  The	  Unfinished	  Business	  
of	  Liberation’	  in	  Review	  of	  African	  Political	  Economy,	  vol.	  35:	  116,	  pp.	  323-­‐330,	  Connell,	  Dan	  (2005a),	  Tronvoll,	  
Kjetil	  (2009)	  
53	  See	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (1998a),	  Müller,	  Tanja	  (2005)	  The	  Making	  of	  Elite	  Women:	  Revolution	  and	  Nation	  Building	  
in	  Eritrea,	  Boston:	  Brill	  Leiden	  and	  Bereketeab,	  Redie	  (2009a)	  ‘Conceptualising	  Civil	  Society	  in	  Afirca:	  The	  Case	  
of	  Eritrea’	  in	  Journal	  of	  Civil	  Society,	  vol.	  5:	  1,	  pp.	  35-­‐59	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policies and decisions. Moreover, it provides a better understanding of how a 
liberation movement has managed to gain sufficient support and strength to control 
Eritrea today. As studies of Eritrean political development tend to focus exclusively on 
the state, these accounts are useful in obtaining a more comprehensive picture of the 
situation. In particular how the two spheres influence or reconstitute each other. While 
there is a lack of this type of study on Eritrea, there are however useful accounts from 
neighbouring country Ethiopia.54 
 Finally, since Eritrea is on the Horn of Africa, a region dominated by violence 
over the last century, some scholars emphasise the international factor when analysing 
Eritrea. A number of academic literature focus here on the regional factor and the 
history of the region, while others takes it further out and stress the international 
context, the role of US and the role of the international community as a whole.55 The 
importance of looking beyond the borders are recognised by most Eritrea scholars and 
are accordingly incorporated in an analysis of the state.56  
 There are, however, few attempts to emphasise the failed democratisation as the 
topic of analysis. Where this topic is addressed, it does not explicitly deal with the 
term of democratisation, but rather explains why the things are the way they are at the 
time of analysis (human rights violations, proxy wars, government crackdown on 
dissent etc.). Moreover, most studies do not use theory. The current government is a 
totalitarian one, and with the narrative of democracy at the time of independence, it is 
peculiar that this issue has not been dealt with more explicitly. When it has been dealt 
with, none of the sources try to adopt a more comprehensive framework to analyse the 
complex process that is democratisation.57 
 
                                                 
54	  See	  Lefort,	  René	  (2007)	  ‘Powers	  –	  mengist	  –	  and	  peasants	  in	  rural	  Ethiopia:	  the	  May	  2005	  election’	  in	  Journal	  
of	  Modern	  African	  Studies,	  vol.	  45:	  2,	  pp.	  253-­‐273	  and	  Vaughan,	  Sarah	  &	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2003)	  The	  Culture	  of	  
Power	  in	  Contemporary	  Ethiopian	  Political	  Life,	  Stockholm:	  SIDA	  Studies	  10	  
55	  See	  Müller,	  Tanja	  (2007)	  ‘Understanding	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Foreign	  Policy-­‐Making	  in	  a	  New	  State:	  The	  Case	  of	  
Eritrea’	  in	  K.	  Adar	  and	  P.	  Schraeder	  (eds.)	  Globalisation	  and	  Emerging	  Trends	  in	  African	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Lanham:	  
University	  Press	  of	  America	  and	  Cliffe,	  Lionel,	  Love,	  Roy	  and	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  ‘Conflict	  and	  Peace	  in	  the	  
Horn	  of	  Africa’	  in	  Review	  of	  African	  Political	  Economy,	  vol.	  36:	  120,	  pp.	  151-­‐163	  
56	  See	  Bereketeab,	  Redie	  (2007),	  and	  Mengisteab,	  Kidane	  and	  Yohannes,	  Okbazaghi	  (2005)	  Anatomy	  of	  an	  
African	  Tragedy:	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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The next chapter will go through different democratisation theories and 
critically analyse them. Based on the theories, the remainder of the chapter will 
propose an alternative framework for analysing democratisation. The framework will 
build on the theories and attempt to adopt a more eclectic approach on the 
phenomenon that is democratisation. The analysis will then go through three analytical 
dimensions: the state, society and external relations. Chapter 3 will first give a brief 
account on how the EPLF operated during the liberation war. It will then proceed to 
analyse the EPLF/PFDJ in government. It will argue that the reasons why the state has 
failed to democratise are to be found in the liberation war. Chapter 4 analyses how the 
role of the society and different actors within society has contributed to the failure of 
democratisation in Eritrea. It will look at the Eritrean society in a historical perspective 
to show how it has shaped political development. The chapter looks at four different 
aspects; General characteristics of the rural population in Eritrea, Eritrea’s history of 
domination and political organisations, the liberation struggle and how the liberation 
movements mobilised Eritreans, and associational life in Eritrea today, in particular 
civil society and opposition movements. Chapter 5 analyses the last analytical 
dimension, external relations. The chapter will first analyse the international 
community’s role in order to understand the government’s worldview. It will then look 
at Eritrea’s relationship with Ethiopia before looking at certain elements with Eritrea’s 
foreign policy. It will conclude by analyse how external relations have impeded the 
democratisation process in Eritrea. Chapter 6 will then conclude and summarise the 








2. Democratisation Theory	  
 
To impose order to the complex phenomenon of democratisation, theories have 
been created in an attempt to explain why countries democratise. Most theories draw 
upon elements of three distinct approaches: modernisation theory; historical sociology 
and transition theory.58 Furthermore, one can find attempts to isolate and explain post-
conflict democratisation. Nevertheless, as this chapter will demonstrate, on their own 
none of these theories manage to capture the whole picture. Theories are useful in that 
they ask vital questions about democratisation and contribute to particular 
explanations.59 Researchers have too often tried to take sides, favouring one particular 
factor over others. Provided the four abovementioned theories all have some truth in 
them, the challenge then is not to choose which one is superior, but to theorise how the 
different factors interplay in the democratisation process.60  
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first will briefly go through 
different democratisation theories and critically analyse them. Based on the theories, 
the second section will propose an alternative framework for analysing 
democratisation. The framework will build on the previous theories and attempt to 
adopt a more eclectic approach on the phenomenon that is democratisation. The 
analysis will then go through three analytical dimensions: the state, society and 
external relations. Since theories are attempts to impose order and find patterns in the 
complex reality that is human life, they are bound to be partial explanations. It is thus 
an advantage to take on a more eclectic approach if one seeks to create a more 
comprehensive picture of the case at hand. 
2.1 Modernisation Theory 
 Looking at capitalist development and democracies after the Second World War 
one can see an apparent link between the two. Modernisation theory uses this link to 
argue that economic development is necessary for a country to democratise. It is an 
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attempt to theorise the fact that democracies have emerged in the modern world under 
capitalism.61 Because of the link, modernisation has often been championed as the 
decisive driver of democratisation. Seymour Martin Lipset first codified modernisation 
in 1959 in his article ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy’. In his article, Lipset 
argues that the more well to do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy.62 By using the variables of urbanisation, industrialisation, wealth and 
education, Lipset found that the countries that scored highest are the most 
democratic.63 According to Lipset, capitalism produced wealth, led to an educated 
middle class and produced cultural changes favourable to democracy.  
In 1996, Leftwich wrote the most influential restatement of modernisation. 
According to Leftwich, stable and secure democracies are rarely found in really poor 
societies. Many new democratic governments inherit an economy in which grotesque 
degrees of inequality exist and democratic politics has never been the politics of 
radical change. Therefore, democracy is improbable in societies polarised by sharp 
differences in income, class, ethnicity, culture or religion.64 Using the examples of 
South Korea, Chile, Hungary and Taiwan, Leftwich points out that these countries 
have emerged or re-emerged into democracy from more or less lengthy but intense 
periods of non-democratic economic development. He concludes then by arguing that 
the West should support developmental elites that are seriously bent on promoting 
economic growth rather than insisting blindly on democracy. By raising the level of 
economic development, according to Leftwich, it will also help to establish or 
consolidate the real internal conditions for lasting democracy.65 
While modernisation still has some stronghold today, it has been subjected to a 
large amount of criticism. Firstly, by assuming that that all societies can replicate a 
transition that actually occurred at particular moment in space and time, modernisation 
can be perceived as quite ahistorical. Secondly, modernisation is to some extent 
ethnocentric because it has extended the application out of the experiences of the 
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Western world for the entire world.66 Third, a typical criticism against modernisation 
is about the methodology employed within modernisation studies. As Grugel argues, 
“put simply, Lipset claimed to have proved that more telephones, more cars, more 
consumption – in sum, more capitalism – leads to more democracy.”67 Finding a 
correlation between capitalism and democracy is not the same as arguing that 
economic development causes democracy. It provides at best a clue to some sort of 
causal connection without indicating its direction.68 Thus, democracy might cause 
economic development and not the other way around. Hence, one can argue that 
modernisation theory is an over-simplified explanation of a very complex process 
because it isolates too many variables that affect a democratisation process.69  
Furthermore, Przeworski and Limongi demonstrate that modernisation only 
helps existing democracies to survive but does not help democracy to emerge.70 
According to them, transitions are increasingly likely as per capita income of 
dictatorships rises, but only until it reaches a level of about $6000. Above that, 
dictatorships become more stable as countries become more affluent.71 Democracies 
are not produced by the development of dictatorships. If they were, the rate at which 
dictatorships make the transition to democracy would increase with the level of 
development. However, research indicates that this is not the case.72 In other words, 
while the modernisation theory is wrong in thinking that development under 
dictatorships breeds democracies, Lipset was correct to argue that once established in a 
wealthy country, democracy is more likely to endure73.  
Nevertheless, Carles Boix and Susan Stokes used the same data as Przeworski 
and Limongi to show that modernisation operates in favour of both the emergence and 
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the survival of democracy.74 Thus, modernisation theory retains influence today 
through its ability to identify the link between capitalism and democracy. However, it 
is unable to explain why trends in democratisation are often contradictory and partial. 
The link between capitalism and democracy does not go so far as to explain why 
democracies emerge.  
 
2.2 Historical Sociology 
Historical sociology concerns the analysis of social change over a broad 
perspective. It uses history as an instrument by which structures are discovered. 
Historical sociology attempts to study the past in an attempt to determine certain 
patterns. In other words, by looking at the history it tries to identify trajectories of 
development or paths. For instance, state development to modernity through war or 
revolution. Its main goal is to go through history in order to explain how things have 
become. Historical sociology traces the transformation of the state over time, through 
class conflict, in order to explain how democracy has sometimes emerged. It is 
interested in how the relationship between the state and classes shapes the political 
system.75  
One of the most influential historical sociologists is Barrington Moore and his 
work on dictatorship and democracy. Here he examines the roles of different social 
groups during the transformation from agrarian to modern industrialised societies.76 
The specific aim was to trace the conditions that led to the emergence of democracy or 
the rise of dictatorships.77 According to Moore, the routes to democracy or dictatorship 
are not alternatives that are in principle open to any society. Rather they are specific 
conditions of successive phases of world history.78 
 In reaction to the excessively society-based accounts of political change in 
1960s, other historical sociologists offered a more state-centred view. Skocpol by 
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looking at historical trends, for instance, argues there can be little question whether 
states are to be taken seriously in social scientific explanations of a wide range of 
phenomena. One thus has to bring the state back into politics.79 Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens and Stephens, in response to the dominance of modernisation theory and 
based on Moore’s work, see democratisation as the imposition of reforms on a 
capitalist state, not as an automatic outcome from the development of capitalist 
relations of production. Without successful and self-conscious reformist strategies on 
the part of the subordinated classes, capitalist states will in fact, almost inevitably be 
authoritarian.80 For them historical research gives insight into conditions, and that is 
indispensible for developing valid causal accounts. They believe a political system of a 
particular country concerns a broader question of social power. By stressing the impact 
of three power structures – relative class power, the role of the state and the impact of 
transitional power structures – they look through sequences of state development to 
see how a political system has developed.81 
The common factors with these authors are that they all agree that it is not 
possible to understand present-day political and social formations without an analysis 
of their history. Historical sociology has its strength in that it is richly grounded and 
explanatory. Furthermore it is not ahistorical like modernisation. De Schweinitz for 
instance concludes that development of democracy in the nineteenth century was a 
function of an unusual configuration of historical circumstances and cannot be 
repeated. The Euro-American route to democracy is no more. Other means must now 
be devised for building new democratic states.82 Historical sociology links democracy 
with conflict and sees confrontations as a normal part of the pattern of the emerging 
democratic order. With its emphasis on history, conflict, class and the state, historical 
sociology can also contribute to explanations of partial or incomplete 
democratisations.83 
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Needless to say, historical sociology has its strengths, but has been the subject 
of criticism. In particular, it has been criticised for putting too much emphasis on 
structures. Przeworski argued that it was too deterministic and treats democracy as an 
outcome uniquely determined by conditions, and history goes on without anyone ever 
doing anything.84 In other words, the success of democratisation was given by past 
conditions and did not depend on political actors’ strategies and choices. Furthermore, 
empirically, historical sociology has not been able to account for the sudden 
democratisation in East and Central Europe and the countries of the ex-Soviet Union. 
Here there was little evidence of struggle for democracy or class agitation, except 
shortly before the collapse.85 This resulted in a new paradigm of democratisation that 
focused more on agents than structures; transition theory. 
2.3 Transition Theory 
 Transition theory argues that modernisation theory and historical sociology see 
the economy, history and development of a state as determining political outcomes. 
Transition theory, however, sees democracy as created by conscious and committed 
actors. Thus, democracy is not a question of waiting for a certain level of prosperity or 
the right moment in history, but a question of actors’ choices. In other words, 
democracy can be created independent of the structural context.86 Przeworski, in his 
critique of structural theories, argues that the protagonists in the struggle for 
democracy could not and did not believe that fate of their countries would be 
determined either by current levels of development, or by the distant past.87 
Transition theory’s starting point grew out as a critique of modernisation.88 
Rustow argues that modernisation theory gets it wrong by arguing that if some 
conditions will help to preserve a democracy, then they will be even more essential to 
bring it into existence. For him, the only background condition for democracy is 
national unity. “It simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be 
                                                 
84	  Przeworski,	  Adam	  (1991)	  Democracy	  and	  The	  Market:	  Political	  and	  economic	  reforms	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  
Latin	  America,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.	  96	  
85	  Grugel,	  Jean	  (2002)	  p.	  55	  
86	  Ibid.	  p.	  57	  
87	  Przeworski,	  Adam	  and	  Limongi,	  Fernando	  (1997)	  p.	  176	  
88	  Grugel,	  Jean	  (2002)	  p.	  57	  
 23 
must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they 
belong to.”89 Against this single background condition, Rustow argues that 
democratisation is a dynamic process and is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive 
political struggle.90 
 The key reference for transition theory has been the seminal transitologist 
analysis of democratisation by Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead. Here, it is a 
focus on the processes of democratisation by examining the interactions, pacts and 
bargains struck between authoritarian leaders and the democratic opposition. This 
leads to transition phase where institutional rules are laid down for the practice of 
democracy and successful transition depends on agreements between elites on both 
sides. Skilful leadership and a degree of luck was the key which lead to democracy.91 
 Transition theory offers a more political explanation of democratisation and 
views it as a process where actors are actively involved and the process is dependent 
on their choices. The common theme is the emphasis on actors and the interactions of 
elites rather than structures. The pacts made shape the terms of transition and those 
terms may not be conducive to democratisation. Its strength is its focus on actors, 
because democracy will never be consolidated without actors, and on processes, 
because democracy is never consolidated over night. By divesting democracy of its 
structural context, the transition perspective suggests that democracy can take root 
outside Western Europe and that the global uprisings in the last decades of the 
twentieth century were in fact struggles for democracy, like for example India and 
Indonesia.92 
 Nevertheless, by mainly focusing on the transition phase and on short-term 
changes, transition theory fail to examine deep-rooted obstacles to democratisation 
over the long term. As Grugel puts it: “When democratisations go wrong it is, by 
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implication, because individuals ‘get it wrong’.”93 Its explanation of why outcomes are 
different places all the emphasis on leadership or the correct policies being 
implemented. This explanation is inadequate because it leaves out the roles of 
structural factors like culture, history and external actors. Furthermore, transition 
theory has been accused of being very elitist in the sense that it views democracy as a 
set of procedures for government negotiated by and between political leaders. It also 
consigns the majority of the people to the role as mere bystanders. Empirical evidence 
points to the role of popular struggles and civil society in some transitions as the 
determining element in unleashing democratisation in the first place.94 
2.4 Post-Conflict Democratisation 
 Building on transition theory, there has also been a debate on how to ‘design’ a 
democracy. Many countries in the transition phase to a democracy often experience 
conflict or ethnic bloodshed. As a consequence, researchers have tried to establish how 
to avoid conflict and introduce a more peaceful transition that does not exacerbate old 
tensions. Edward Mansfield, Jack Snyder and Thomas Carothers are perhaps the most 
famous researchers within this field. Their debate on sequentialism versus gradualism 
has dominated the discussion on how to best tackle the problems facing states in a 
transition phase from authoritarian rule to democracy.  
 Troubled by violent conflict breaking out in former authoritarian states, 
Mansfield and Snyder argue that democratising states are in fact more conflict-prone 
than stable autocracies.95 Their research shows that transitional countries that were 
comparatively well endowed with the prerequisites of democratic politics, such as 
competent and impartial state institutions, were unlikely to detour into violence. 
Rather than pushing states to democratise before the necessary preconditions are in 
place, one should pay special attention to fostering those preconditions. Their general 
rule is to start the democratisation process by building the institutions that democracy 
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requires, and then encouraging mass political participation and electoral competition 
only after these institutions have begun to take root.96  
 As a response to Mansfield and Snyder’s sequentialism, Carothers argues that 
gradually introducing key components of political competition is a better alternative 
than putting off democracy until institutions are in place. He believes that the idea of 
sequencing is mistaken because rule-of-law development and autocracy go poorly 
together. For Carothers, the lines of accountability between citizens and the state that 
elections help to create, however imperfectly, fortify efforts to hold public officials to 
law, which is a central part of rule-of-law development. Gradualism is different from 
sequencing in that it does not put off elections until the institutions have begun to take 
root, but only postpones these at most for several years. This allows in-depth 
negotiations between opposing political groups so that the main political forces can get 
used to dealing with one another peacefully and agree on the rules of the game before 
potentially divisive elections are held. 97 
 Post-conflict democratisation theory differs from transition theory in that it 
focuses more on institutions than agents and isolates the democratisation process after 
a transition has begun. Both these approaches have faith in the elite facilitating and 
building a democracy, but they do not account for how citizens who have lived for 
decades under a non-democratic regime suddenly become democratic. As Törnquist 
argues, the technocratic approach of designing institutions that will facilitate a 
peaceful democratisation process is both empirically and theoretically flawed. 
Autocratic leaders have been, and will in the future, be masters at being perceived as 
democratic through building the ‘right’ institutions, but still maintaining full control 
over the state.98 While both approaches are correct in emphasising the transition 
process itself, a democracy is not built only ‘by getting the institutions right’. It is just 
as important to emphasise popular capacity building and organisation building and a 
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government that is ready to dedicate itself to facilitating popular representations. In 
other words, institutions should utilise demands from below.99 
 It is worth noting that while none of the approaches try to explain why a 
democracy emerge, they can provide important tools for analysing why a country 
undergoing a transition to democracy either fails or succeeds to democratise. They can 
be viewed as complimentary framework to analyse a state after the democratisation 
process has begun and can further explain why a state fails to democratise. This is 
crucial for the analysis of Eritrea. 
 
2.5 An Alternative Framework:  
Towards an Eclectic Model for Analysing Democratisation In Eritrea 
The different theories explored so far put their emphasis on several different, 
yet, important factors. They shed light on different aspects of regime breakdown, 
transition and immediate post-transition politics. Modernisation theory’s strength is its 
ability to show the link between democracy and economic development. Historical 
sociology emphasises that it is not possible to understand present-day social 
formations without an analysis of their history. With its emphasis on history, conflict, 
class and the state, historical sociology can also contribute to explanations of partial or 
incomplete democratisations. Transition theory stresses the role of actors and 
understands that without choices, democratisation will never succeed. Post-conflict 
democratisation highlights the initial transition period and how the institutions are 
designed as important factors for the democratisation process to avoid any form of 
reversal. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, on their own 
none of these theories manage to capture the whole picture of any country in 
transition, not least Eritrea. Democratisation is a complex and risky process, and even 
if it commences with transition it does not always end in democratic consolidation. 
Most of the theories discussed in this chapter have placed their main focus on 
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explaining why democracies emerge, but not why they fail. Furthermore, none of 
them, on their own, explains sufficiently why some may start out as democracy, but 
during the democratisation process fails to consolidate. Hence, none of these theories 
can on its own give a comprehensive picture of why a state succeeds or fails to 
democratise 
Thus a need for a more holistic approach exists if one desires to fully analyse a 
state’s democratisation process. In order to create such a framework, this thesis will 
base itself on the theories discussed and create a more eclectic model for analysing 
democratisation. The model first and foremost builds on the insights of historical 
sociology. In other words, history and the structures it creates are central for 
explaining outcomes. However, instead of analysing only class struggles and conflicts, 
the model will put its emphasis on actors. The contribution from transition theory, that 
democratisation is a dynamic process, shaped by human behaviour and choices is thus 
the second central element in this model. Modernisation theory have been concerned 
with understanding why democratisation begins. So far, this chapter has been very 
critical to modernisation theory, but its long-term perspective is worth following. 
Democratisation requires collective action. A strong working class or other subaltern 
groups that organise to promote political change is further strengthened if a state is 
more economically developed. In Eritrea, the large majority of citizens are peasants, 
and one can thus argue that peasants’ involvement in politics is more likely if they live 
under economically developed conditions. It is important to at least acknowledge this 
fact when analysing a state’s democratisation process.  
Additionally, the insights garnered from post-conflict democratisation theory, 
namely that one has to look at how democratic institutions are implemented, will also 
be incorporated.  How the institutions work in further promoting, not only a 
democratic leadership, but also a democratic culture amongst their population is 
crucial in consolidating democracy. The model will thus pay extra attention to the 
choices taken during a transition. To summarise, actors are necessary to analyse 
because they are the only ones who can democratise a state. But rather than analysing 
them only during the transition period, this model will use the insights from historical 
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sociology and see how structures shaped their choices and mentality. Such structures 
include culture, history, economic development and international politics. 
To do this, the model makes use of three analytical dimensions to analyse the 
democratisation process, namely the state, society and external relations. This is based 
on the analytical frameworks of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens and Grugel.100 
In both these works they propose a three-dimensional framework, but whereas the 
former focus on power and class struggles the model used here will focus on actors. It 
is more similar to Grugel’s framework, but where Grugel believes in the concept of 
globalisation, this model will place more emphasis on the state’s relationship with the 
international society and other states, in particular its neighbouring states. The aim of 
this section is to review the three analytical dimensions. The assumption is that a 
democratisation process is affected by several factors. To explain the success or failure 
of such a process one has to analyse how these three dimensions have influenced it. 
The construction of these dimensions is gathered from the readings on democratisation 
theory. It is worth noting that these analytical dimensions are suggestive and the author 
will return to the importance of them in the conclusion. This chapter will now proceed 
to review these dimensions, relating them to the case of Eritrea, and justifying why 
these three are important when analysing the success or failure of a democratisation 
process. 
2.5.1 The State 
 According to Lindberg, there is emerging consensus that successful 
democratisation requires settling the issues of how to form the idea of a single nation 
and how to agree on the legitimacy of the territorial state.101 But the state is more than 
just its nationhood and borders. It is who controls it and the choices they make. And it 
is at the top-level that important decisions are taken. The ones who are in power are 
the ones with both the authority and resources to make the fundamental changes. In a 
democratic state, the state itself is a major actor and it must prove to its citizens that it 
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is both effective and real. It is at state level that political decisions are realised and the 
right institutions and policies can facilitate a better democratic transition.  
The state is the embodiment and essence of political power and is vital to 
democratisation in a number of ways. First, democratisation is about building a 
democratic state. This includes changes within the state: who controls the state policies 
through representative change and the range of state responsibilities. Second, 
democratisation implies that the state makes promises that people will live more secure 
lives and the judicial system works impartially. For this to happen, states need to be 
able to carry out complex functions. Third, states are actors with interests and the 
power to invest in these interests. As a result, states may have interest in either 
subverting or promoting the democratisation process.  
Grugel emphasises that the centrality of state culture, practices and embedded 
legacies, is a means to understand why democratisation projects so often fail to live up 
to their initial promise.102 Historical sociology argues that previous state structures and 
regime forms shape later political developments.103 It is thus important to look at how 
both previous regime structures and possible conflicts and other historical events shape 
the democratisation process. Eritrea is a totalitarian state and the agent of analysis is 
thus the government party, the PFDJ, since they have total control over the state 
apparatus. The PFDJ has its origins from the liberation war and it is thus important to 
analyse how this period has shaped the PFDJ’s outlook, ideology and policies. Here 
are general characteristics, history, how they managed to mobilise Eritreans and how 
this has affected the state’s perception of autonomy and other influences. Furthermore, 
one has to analyse not only how the history has shaped later political development but 
also look at the choices made by decision-makers during the actual democratisation 
process.  
2.5.2 Society 
 Whereas the state has the power and resources to facilitate a democratisation, 
the society has the power to affect and pressure the decision makers. Bratton states that 
the democratisation in the 1990s in Africa occurred mainly because ordinary Africans 
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began to demand greater accountability from their leaders.104 Democracy describes a 
particular relationship between the state and society: popular control over public 
affairs. Grugel argues that democracy represents a shift in the power balance within 
civil society and as a result, any explanation of democratisation must pay attention to 
the role of mass participation and the struggles for rights and citizenship.105 In his 
framework he emphasises the civil society. It is a means for checking and controlling 
the state and a tool to push the state towards deeper reforms. A weak civil society 
implies a thin democracy, where patterns of participation are low and where the state 
has few obligations to listen to society.106 In Eritrea, there is no civil society, since all 
popular organisations must register with the government. The consequence is lack of 
holding the government accountable, and needs to be further explored. 
Lindberg supports a theory that a strong and active civil society is the outcome 
of liberalisation and electoral practice and not their cause.107 But looking at society as 
a whole, it is clear that movements, associations and large groups of normal citizens, 
which are recognised as carrying out upsurges against an authoritarian regime, were 
formed long before transitions and arose during period of severe repression.108 Society 
is defined as a community of people, and the Eritrean society is thus the whole 
Eritrean community of people. In a democracy it is the people who, at least in theory, 
rule the country. The point here is that civil society is often characterised in more 
structured forms as controlling the state actions in form of checking and balancing109 
the state’s decisions. But looking at it in broader terms it is also possible to analyse 
how a country’s society act, behave and organise also during repression and or if no 
independent civil society is allowed to exist. Eritrea is a peasant community and 
thorough exploration of how this community works, can improve an understanding of 
the democratisation process in the Red Sea country. 
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Hence, one has to look at the country’s society in a more historical perspective 
to see how that shape later political developments as well. Additionally, one will need 
to analyse the pressure from the society during the democratisation process as well. It 
is clear that many citizens have strong grievances and their demands can influence the 
democratisation process as well. As the society can be seen as a counterpart to the 
state, similar things will be looked at, general characteristics, history, mobilisation and 
society’s autonomy and influences.  
2.5.3 External Relations 
Most analyses of democratisation have treated it as primarily a national issue by 
paying little attention to the influences from the international environment. The factors 
that were attributed explanatory power belonged mainly to the domestic social and 
political life, implying that democratisation had little to do with the forces operating 
outside national borders. 110 However, as Evans et al. argues, it is not enough simply to 
trace processes over time within national boundaries.111 This framework bases itself on 
two frameworks that pay attention to the international context. Rueschemeyer et al. 
argue that states do not exist in isolation from each other. It is only as a part of a 
system of states the modern state and its development can be understood.112 Grugel 
emphasises the global character of the international system and that the fate of 
democratisation is largely bound up with globalisation.113 Lindberg, who states that, at 
least in Africa, international support for elections have facilitated a move towards 
better and more stable democracies, contributing to the experience of greater freedoms 
for a greater number of people, further confirms this.114  
The focus on globalisation and how democracy has turned into the only 
legitimate form of political domination is thus central. It is central in that there are 
forces outside a state that influence the domestic actors’ choices. Powerful states 
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seeking their own agenda, transnational non-governmental organisations and 
international agencies all have the means and power to both influence the state and 
society and assist in easing the transition process. According to Whitehead, the key 
actors involved in democratisation may have been overwhelmingly domestic, but their 
strategies and calculations have often been strongly shaped by the pressure of 
externally designed rules and structures.115 It is thus important see to what extend the 
international community has contributed to political development in Eritrea. This can 
also give a better understanding of the Eritrea’s reactions and perceptions to foreign 
influence. 
Nevertheless, Gleditsch and Ward found that the probability that an autocracy 
will become a democracy markedly increases when most of its neighbouring states are 
democracies, or experiencing transitions to democracy.116 Thus, while international 
factors are important to evaluate, regional relations are just as important. Neighbouring 
states can be enemies or allies, have destabilising effects on the democratisation 
process, and affect trade and the state policies of its neighbours. Eritrea’s relationship 
with Ethiopia, a relationship characterised by hatred and violence, is thus another 
factor that needs to be explored. As a result, state development must be analysed by 
also looking at its external relations. It is important to understand the difference 
between external policy and external relations. While Eritrea is itself exclusively 
responsible for its policies, external relations entail a complicated relationship where 
different actors’ behaviour affects each other.  That is how international forces and 
regional actors try to influence domestic state policies, but also how domestic state 
policies react to external pressures.  
2.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter has critically analysed some of the most influential 
democratisation theories and argued that while all of them have some stronghold, on 
their own they cannot explain the complexities involved in a democratisation process. 
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Modernisation theory identifies economic development as the benchmark for an 
emerging democratic order and adapts a long-term strategy of analysis. Historical 
sociology emphasise the centrality of the invisible structures for understanding any 
political order. Transition theory argues that if elites and leaders are able to engage 
with a view to achieve compromise, democracy will eventually succeed. Finally, post-
conflict democratisation theory calls attention to the importance of how a democracy 
should be designed after the transition. None of them are insignificant in an analysis of 
democratisation, but none of them manage to capture the whole picture. In addition, 
none of them pay sufficient attention to factors outside the domestic structures. 
 As a solution, this chapter has proposed a more eclectic model of analysis using 
three analytical dimensions: the state, society and external relations. By stressing the 
importance of actors and their choices, but by looking at it in a more long term 
perspective the model bases itself first and foremost on transition theory and historical 
sociology in order to analyse democratisation. In addition, it takes into account the 
decisions made after a transition. In a democracy, the people are central and whilst the 
transition theory does not pay sufficient attention to mass participation, the model still 
bases itself on the fact that actors are central. And both post-conflict democratisation 
theory and historical sociology have paid attention to the citizens. Thus the society is 
included as another important actor. Furthermore, it is clear that no state acts totally 
isolated from outside forces. It is hence important to include the international context 
in one’s analysis. In other words, the character of the required analysis in all three 
dimensions is historical and sequential, with the focus on actors who potentially 
influence the democratisation process.  
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3. The State – The Liberation war and its legacies 
 
The ruling party, the PFDJ, controls the state in Eritrea: They control the 
government and the few ‘NGOs’. And without an independent judiciary, autonomous 
civil society and any opposition in the country there are no checks and balances at 
work in Eritrea. When analysing the state in Eritrea, it is therefore vital that one 
analyses the ruling party and their political culture. The PFDJ has its roots in the 
liberation war where it was called the EPLF. Many of its central figures have been 
with the party since the beginning of the liberation struggle. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, it is important to look at previous regime structures and conflicts to 
see how they have shaped the current government in the democratisation process. In 
this case it is the liberation war and how that has influenced the PFDJ that will be an 
important element. This chapter will first give a brief account on how the EPLF 
worked during the liberation war. It will then continue and analyse the EPLF/PFDJ in 
government. It will argue that the ruling party has failed to transform itself into a 
civilian party. The reasons for why the state has failed to democratise can be found in 
the liberation war. The ruling party is still characterised by the same war-mentality it 
had during the liberation struggle.   
 
3.1 The Liberation War 
 The Eritrean liberation war began in 1961 when Eritrean autonomy was being 
gradually dismantled and Ethiopia’s intentions of annexing Eritrea became clear. The 
early years of the liberation war were dominated by the Eritrean Liberation Front 
(ELF), but due to differing views on liberation strategy and ideology, four groups left 
the ELF and formed the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF), which later developed into 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). The ELF was multi-religious and 
multi-ethnic and this in turn exacerbated factionalism within the ELF.117 The lack of 
unity within the ELF made it weaker and less efficient in its struggle for independence. 
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The liberation war was not only liberation movements fighting the different 
Ethiopian regimes, but also a fight over who had the hegemony over Eritrean 
liberation forces. As a result, the years between the early 1970s and early 1980s 
witnessed sporadic wars between the ELF and the EPLF. In 1981, the EPLF emerged 
victorious, expelling the ELF into Sudan. Thereafter, the EPLF set about presenting 
itself as the sole legitimate expression of nationalist aspirations.118 The main reason 
the ELF fell apart during the liberation war was ethnic division. Based on this 
experience, the EPLF wanted a highly united, disciplined and centralised authoritarian 
structure devoid of any type of religious or ethnic sentiments. Therefore, the EPLF had 
hegemony of the Eritreans liberation war and could define the nationalist narrative of 
the Eritreans seeking independence. The success of the EPLF in suppressing its 
internal rivals and external enemy enabled it to exert stable control over the population 
and territory. Thus opening up access to the goods produced within the territory, 
rendering it the sole rulers.119 Furthermore, the highly united character, which focused 
on being Eritrean rather than the ethnic or religious identity, made the EPLF a strong 
force with support from all over Eritrea. The EPLF’s main achievement, according to 
Connell, was the mobilisation of the people from nine distinct ethnic groups into a 
united, highly motivated and well-disciplined force.120 It mobilised the Eritreans 
through a social revolution. It focused on abolishing what the EPLF saw as primitive 
ethnic traditions, curbing the importance of the Orthodox Church and strengthening 
the role of women. All these underpinned the attempt at reaching the higher goal of 
national unity, since it would break down other identity categories such as ethnicity, 
religion and gender. As a result, national unity and focus on a single goal 
(independence) was translated into uncritical loyalty and unquestioning obedience.121 
 Another striking feature of the EPLF was the clandestine nature of its 
operations. This was apparent long before EPLF’s formation. When the 1958 strike in 
Asmara was violently suppressed by the Eritrean unionist government in collaboration 
with their allies in Ethiopia, all avenues of peaceful resistance were closed. Eritrean 
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nationalists were left without any alternatives but to go underground and secretly 
organise the pursuit of the struggle in a more clandestine fashion.122 Throughout the 
war of independence, a clandestine inner party, called the Eritrean People’s 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP), secretly led the EPLF. This structure was headed by 
Isaias and was established in the beginning of the 1970s. Isaias was strongly 
influenced by Maoist ideology and principles of ‘democratic centralism’. The EPRP 
worked as an inner decision-making unit, providing ideological guidance to the 
struggle and defining the premises for EPLF’s operational policies. The EPRP 
secretively convened ahead of every important EPLF congress or gathering, deciding 
on the formulation of the EPLF programme and putting the ‘right’ individuals in place 
for the so-called ‘elected’ positions in the EPLF.123  
 Influenced by the Chinese, any EPRP or EPLF members who broke the rules 
would be punished mercilessly and then rehabilitated.124 The EPLF could be ruthless 
in dealing with dissenters. In 1974, it executed at least 11 dissidents. The victims 
objected to the use of force to suppress criticism. The leadership’s actions set the tone 
for the way in which Eritrea society was mobilised by the leadership during the armed 
struggle.125 Anyone opposing the EPLF’s decisions was perceived as an enemy, no 
matter how high-ranking the person was. Because there were other groups fighting for 
Eritrean independence, there were many violent internal conflicts. It was a war of who 
had the right to represent the Eritrean liberation war. As a result, the legitimate 
questioning of authority was regarded as a threat to the very survival of the 
organisation and was automatically placed on the security agenda. In order to ensure 
loyalty to EPLF, members were subjected to systematic indoctrination and 
intimidation. This again, Kibreab argues, produced obedient, intolerant and atomised 
cadres led by a few individuals who were not accountable to anyone. The shunning of 
accountability was mostly under the pretext of the threat of insecurity.126 
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 A fourth feature of the EPLF during the liberation war was its strategy of self-
reliance. While the Eritrean unionists and their Ethiopian allies were supported by the 
two superpowers during the Cold War, the EPLF had only themselves to rely on. The 
EPLF’s departure point was that any outside support would ultimately lead to external 
interference.127 By the 1980s, the EPLF had developed the strategy of self-reliance to a 
level probably never achieved by any liberation movement before or since. As time 
wore on, spontaneity gave way to the conscious development of the principle, such 
that it became a distinguishing feature of the EPLF.128 During the war, the EPLF’s 
self-sufficiency strategy was very effectively. According to Kibreab, it was actually 
one of the factors that contributed to the survival and growth of the EPLF despite the 
unfavourable international situation.129 It is worth noting, however, that the EPLF 
received financial support from the diaspora as well as international NGOs. Self-
sufficiency was not only self-reliance in the sense that it did not receive anything from 
external sources; it was also in the neutral sense of partnership rather than 
dependence.130 
 Eventually, the EPLF gained more and more control over Eritrean areas and in 
May 1991, the EPLF threw out the last remaining outposts in the country and the 
capital Asmara was liberated. In 1993 Eritrea gained its de jure independence after a 
referendum and the EPLF as the dominant Eritrean force took the seat as a provisional 
government until a new constitution had been written and implemented and elections 
had been held.131 The EPLF’s principles of national unity, self-reliance and the 
clandestine nature as well as the war-mentality of dealing with enemies were now to 
be transformed into a civilian party and a culture of peace. In 1997 the Constitution 
was ratified, but, according to the government, due to the second war with Ethiopia 
(1998-2000) it has not been implemented. All elections have been postponed 
                                                 
127	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  p.	  172	  
128	  Tesfai,	  Alemseged	  (2003)	  ‘Land	  &	  Liberation	  in	  Eritrea:	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Lionel	  Cliffe’	  in	  Review	  of	  
African	  Political	  Economy,	  vol.	  30:96,	  p.	  249	  
129	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  p.	  173	  
130	  Ibid.	  p.	  173	  
131	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  p.	  136	  
 38 
indefinitely.132 The remaining parts of this chapter will now look at how the 
EPLF/PFDJ dealt with the four abovementioned aspects.  
3.2 EPLF/PFDJ’s characteristic - National unity 
 The EPLF’s process of forging an Eritrean nationality during the liberation war 
was in some respects well advanced. Neither the religious or ethnic hostilities, nor the 
pressures of the absolutist state that controlled Eritrea, were strong enough to contain 
the emergence of widely diffused and popular Eritrean nationalism. Nevertheless, the 
process of forming a national identity was not without tensions. The character of the 
Eritrean nationalism that emerged was, as Makki observes, increasingly conditioned 
by the imperatives of order and discipline.133 
 After independence, the EPLF, learning from past experiences, called for unity 
of all ethnic groups, regions, religions and classes under its exclusive leadership. 
Because the EPLF successfully quashed its internal rivals and external enemies during 
the liberation war, there was neither the incentive nor the compulsion to open the 
corridors of power and share them with others. After all, that power had been earned 
through literal sweat and blood.134 The provisional government declared that Eritrea 
and its mass organisations were open to all individuals, regardless of their previous 
political affiliations, provided they renounced their previous political convictions and 
embraced the EPLF.135 As mentioned above, ethnic and religious tensions caused the 
ELF to fall apart and EPLF’s ability to unite religious and ethnic groups was a key to 
its success. Consistent with the EPLF-fighter ethic, heterogeneity was perceived as 
being divisive and was undesirable. As a result, the government sought to deny the 
heterogeneity of Eritrean society.136 
 The focus on national unity is very clearly exemplified in the PFDJ’s National 
Charter for Eritrea. The Charter, ratified at the PFDJ’s third congress in 1994, states 
six basic goals for the future of Eritrea; national harmony, political democracy, 
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economic and social development, social justice, cultural revival, and regional and 
international cooperation. These six goals will be pursued through the means of 
different principal guidelines where national unity is declared as the paramount 
guideline to which all work and policies will be aligned. All divisive attitudes and 
activities are rejected and places national unity above everything else.137 National 
unity is thus the EPLF/PFDJ’s core value. One of the prime policies of the PFDJ 
government, in order to further unite Eritrea has been the implementation of 
compulsory national service for all men and women when they reach the age of 
eighteen. Under normal circumstances, the national service is supposed to last eighteen 
months, but after the border-war with Ethiopia in 1998-2000, it is now indefinite.138 
By putting youth from the different ethnic groups together under military order to fight 
for and defend their common motherland, Eritrea tries to foster national unity and 
eliminate sub-national feelings. This will, according to the PFDJ, enhance and cement 
the national spirit that was created during the liberation war.139 
 The emphasis on national unity was an advantage for the EPLF in wartime and 
what Kibreab calls, a “necessary contingency in an ethnically heterogeneous and 
impoverished country.” Nevertheless, post-independence, national unity has created 
policies that have not only denied ethnic groups the protection of their cultural or 
minority rights but also banned many religions and only allowing four (Lutheran, 
Orthodox, Catholic and Islam) to exist. If these four religions do in fact make 
statements that the government finds to pose a threat to the principle of national unity, 
it will intervene like it did when the Orthodox Church leaders protested against human 
rights violations and tried to assert the church’s autonomy. As a result, the patriarch 
was put under house arrest in 2005 and a government-controlled patriarch took his 
place.140  
More importantly, the PFDJ has banned all political parties and postponed 
elections under the banner of national unity as it would divide the people rather than 
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unite them. As a consequence, national unity based on exclusion is not a step towards 
democratisation - it is a step away from it. Needless to say, the implementation of 
national unity is very vague in the Eritrean society, this is because policies and 
decisions are often created behind closed doors. 
3.3 History of dominating - Clandestine nature of the party 
In the name of national unity the EPLF created an ideology that emphasised the 
centrality of the leadership as the body that could realise EPLF’ historic mission. In 
the post-liberation period the central figure Isaias’ grip on the body politic grew even 
wider and tighter with the concentration of the reins of power in the office of the 
president.141 At the EPLF’s third congress in 1994, when it morphed into the PFDJ, 
Isaias also convinced many veterans to step aside from the leadership in order to bring 
new blood into the political movement. Needless to say, he rarely used the front’s 
newly elected bodies to decide issues. Instead the PFDJ’s 19-member executive 
council spent most of its time discussing how to implement policies determined 
elsewhere. 142  
The PFDJ copied the EPLF’s operational forms during the liberation struggle, 
but with one minor difference: there was no organised party providing the guidance – 
no collective body, however secret, operating behind the scenes. There was only one 
man and his personally selected advisers.143 In this respect, the EPLF’s operational 
form during the liberation struggle, when the clandestine EPRP had ‘guided’ the 
organisation, is similar to that of the post-independence period where the president and 
his advisers ‘guide’ the government. The same was true of the state. Though the new 
government had the appearance of a separation of powers, it was an illusion. The 
cabinet did not provide a forum for debate or decision-making. It served mainly as a 
clearing-house to determine how policies created elsewhere would be put into 
practice.144 This was also the case with regional and local stakeholders.145 
Furthermore, while the process leading up to the draft constitution was carried out in 
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an open and inclusive manner, Tronvoll states that the secretary to the commission 
personally oversaw that the final version was in line with the interests and ideology of 
the EPLF/PFDJ. As such “it did not necessarily reflect the opinions and interests 
advanced by the Eritrean public during [the constitution making] process.”146  
What was a clandestine feature of a liberation movement has become even more 
secretive post-independence. By centralising everything around Isaias and his closest, 
there is no room for voicing disagreement, because it is difficult to know who to talk 
to. Thus, over-centralisation, as Mengisteab argues, hampers the development of 
institutions throughout the government.147 The secrecy around the central decision-
making personalities during the liberation war was most likely a smart move because 
of the fear of hostile infiltrators, however in post-independence it is a major obstacle to 
an open and tolerant Eritrean society. 
3.4 Mobilising Eritreans - Dealing with dissent 
The Eritrean government claim that they are the true representatives of the 
Eritrean people’s and state’s national interests, justifying this with the result of the 
referendum of national independence.148 In fact, the EPLF/PFDJ does not believe that 
anyone else is in a position to do a better job.149 They had fought for national 
independence and defeated not only Ethiopia, but also other liberation movements. 
The internal war confirmed in the minds of the EPLF’s leadership that there was no 
room for debate and dissent in the vortex of competing nationalisms, and in the face of 
a powerful enemy. Nevertheless, the perspective that enemies were still out there was 
still a dominant narrative in the Eritrean government. The secrecy and internal strife 
during the liberation war was still present post-independence. It is the legacy of 
conflict among Eritreans that informs the government’s current intolerance of 
dissidence.150 The people could not be trusted to rule themselves, especially because 
enemies and spies could manipulate them against their interests.  
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Kibreab writes that the Eritrean government has exhibited an unmistakeable 
appetite to over-securitise issues.151 Thus, any type of opposition is put on the security 
agenda and is repressed on the basis of national security. As the EPLF/PFDJ had the 
monopoly to rule, it expected Eritreans to follow it just like they did during the 
liberation war. The logic of coercion as an instrument to ensure dominance during the 
liberation war was, according to Bereketeab, replicated during the post-independence 
period. In particular during the political crisis that arose in the aftermath of the second 
war with Ethiopia where those who entertained critical views were forcible silenced 
without their case being proved in the court of law.152 
Political pluralism and debate flourished briefly in the late 1940s, as part of the 
underground nationalist movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s; and then even 
more briefly in 2000-2001.153 However, the EPLF/PFDJ has allowed little room for 
discussion or dissent. This is probably best exemplified with the protest of the G-15. In 
the aftermath of the second war with Ethiopia, an internal dissent movement within the 
government party started to question the authority of, and decisions made by the 
President Isaias, saying that he had forgotten the basic goals and the EPLF/PFDJ’s 
core value. An initial group of 15 top-level government officials coordinated their 
critique of the president, thus called the G-15. Eritrean independent newspapers and 
civil society representatives joined in to challenge the monopolisation of power by the 
PFDJ and the lack of democratic development in the country. This process was 
terminated in September 2001, when the president ordered a nation-wide crack down, 
arresting hundreds of critics, closing down all private media and curtailing all civil 
society activities.154 It was of course a hard blow for the government that the criticism 
had originated within its own party. In the eyes of the Isaias, after the war and with 
many opposing the leadership, now was the time to focus on the core value. The nation 
should first be made to stand firmly on both its feet before any democratic 
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development could commence. And it was the President and his closest that were the 
right people for this. The mental set-up led to a kind of political culture where any 
criticism of the leadership, difference of opinion, and attempts to reform was perceived 
as betraying the nation. 155 
The establishment of the Special Court in 1996 was a clear sign that the Eritrean 
leadership had similar ways of dealing with dissent post-independence. This court, 
whose judges answer only to the President, deals with economic and political crimes. 
Most of the people were arrested without due process, and persons who had been tried 
and freed by the civil courts were later re-arrested and sentenced by the Special 
Court.156 Furthermore, many of those arrested have been subject to severe torture and 
unbearable conditions.157 The people arrested are often being accused of posing a 
threat to national security and the government. Just like the EPLF during the liberation 
war perceived dissent as a threat and the people voicing it as enemies, the PFDJ still 
perceives dissent as enemies attempting to destroy what the government is trying to 
build. Like a stubborn child, the Eritrean government believes it can do it all by itself. 
3.5 Autonomy and influences - Self-reliance 
 The EPLF’s point of departure was that an organisation that received foreign 
aid or grants, would never be able to exercise political independence without external 
interference. According to Kibreab, the same is true of the PFDJ today. Behind every 
donation, they assume there is a sinister ulterior motive.158 Since independence, the 
Eritrean government has justified its rule and right to sovereignty by displaying the 
solidarity of its people and embracing the concept of self-reliance in the face of aid-
dependence.159 In the Eritrean government’s view, the voluntary sector – civil society 
and international NGOs’ interventions – invariably breed dependency.160 
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Self-reliance was a strategy during the liberation war in the context of fighting a 
foe. It is therefore also important to see today’s strategy of self-reliance in the context 
of enemies. Today, the Eritrean government perceives the Ethiopian government as its 
biggest threat to survival (this will be analysed further later in the thesis). In addition 
there is rhetoric of infiltrators from Ethiopia, the CIA, and so forth, that will try to 
destroy the very existence of Eritrea. Whether this threat is real or not is not important. 
But just as the EPLF managed to successfully fight off powerful enemies with its self-
reliance strategy, the PFDJ believes that it cannot trust anyone else and that self-
reliance is an appropriate strategy post-independence.  
Self-reliance is not just rhetoric. Eritrea relies on its own resources and 
technical capabilities as opposed to relying on aid-organised projects or inviting 
tenders by foreign corporations. Much of this is organised through conscription into 
national service, now on permanent scale, with an estimated 400,000 young people in 
service.161 It is impossible, Kibreab argues, “for Eritrea to become self-sufficient in 
food and other necessities when a substantial proportion of the agricultural, industrial 
and service sector labour force is mobilised into the army and scarce resources with 
high opportunity costs are squandered in the purchase of weapons.”162 World Bank 
and IMF reports states that the main cause of the poor economic performance of 
agriculture and manufacturing is a shortage of labour caused by mobilisation into the 
army of the skilled and unskilled labour force.163 Moreover, self-reliance is 
complimented by another element, namely self-sacrifice. Isaias is known to sacrifice 
people to starvation in order to preserve self-reliance. The people are, according to 
Isaias, sacrificing themselves for the better of the state. In other words, the suffering of 
individuals is not important. It is the ‘Eritreaness’ and the nation-state as a whole that 
is the most important thing. Thus, someone dying as a result of self-reliance is 
considered a sacrifice for the Eritrean nation-state.164 
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 It is clear that the EPLF was very successful during the liberation war with its 
self-reliance strategy. While its enemies received support from superpowers and were 
still defeated, the EPLF/PFDJ’s obsession with this strategy post-independence has 
been a main cause for poor economic performance, and exclusion of the voluntary 
sector and international support to help boost the economy. The politics of self-
reliance is a mechanism the state uses to control society. Various religious and other 
NGOs have been kept out of Eritrea, and the state used this method to consolidate its 
power and prevent outsiders from observing conditions in the country.165 Additionally, 
self-reliance is also, in the eyes of the government, needed to breed the ‘Eritreaness’ 
and national unity. On the other side of the coin one finds self-sacrifice.  
3.6 National Liberation Movements 
 What this analysis has tried to show is that the Eritrean state inherited the 
features of the EPLF. The current Eritrean government’s focus on national unity and 
self-reliance, clandestine character and mentality towards dissent all has its roots in the 
liberation war and can be seen as patent factors of the totalitarian Eritrea. Kibreab 
argues that appearances notwithstanding, nothing substantial has changed since the 
EPLF’s early manifestos.166 But what could be understood as necessary strategies 
during times of war, do not justify a state’s dictatorial behaviour in peacetime. But this 
misfortune is by no means unique to Eritrea. National liberation movements emerge 
from a combination of factors, but according to Kibreab, common to them all is the 
subordination of liberal values to national independence.  
 Suttner argues that national liberation movements predisposed themselves 
towards a particular type of politics, self-conception and relationship with other 
organisations and the people or nation as a whole.167 Many of these organisations were 
forced to work underground and then embark on armed resistance. Thus, these 
organisations had little experience of open organised activity and have seen 
participation in a liberation movement as a primarily secretive and military activity.168 
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This is particularly true of the EPLF/PFDJ. Their “bunker mentality”169 during the 
liberation war, was in no way reversed post-independence. Secretive and military 
activity is just as normal for the PFDJ today as it was for the EPLF during the 
liberation war. The lack of experience of open organised activity, combined with the 
experience from the liberation struggle, has not transformed soldiers into politicians, 
but rather continued the war-mentality post-independence.  
 Suttner further argues that the notion of a national liberation movement 
representing the nation tends to lead to the treatment of other organisations as ancillary 
to that effort. There was a tendency in independent African states to see organisation 
outside the umbrella of the movement as divisive and even aiding enemies of national 
unity. As a result, the early years of African independence saw widespread 
clampdowns on organisations established on a regional or ethnic basis. Various ethnic 
movements were suppressed and a variety of complex forms and identities in which 
people saw themselves were not allowed to find expression in the political arena.170 
While this could be an accurate description of Eritrea, it was also normal in many 
other African countries like Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Angola and Congo.171 
 The main argument is that the Eritrean liberation movement, the EPLF is by no 
means a unique movement. It has many of the same patterns that many other liberation 
movements have. This also further emphasises the importance of looking at the current 
Eritrean government in the context of the thirty yearlong liberation war. The EPLF’s 
Maoist and Marxist-Leninist influence could also be seen as a warning sign in the 
beginning of independence. It shares the same rural based and Marxist-inspired 
character as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Angola to name but a few. 
Barrington Moore’s description of the revolutionary communist route taken by Russia 
and China is thus similar to the Eritrean experience.172  
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 The Eritrean state has been an agent in causing the failure of democratisation. 
This chapter has analysed the ruling party, the PFDJ, using historical sociology. By 
comparing the PFDJ’s behaviour and policies today with the EPLF’s behaviour and 
policies during the liberation war one can see few changes. One can thus argue that the 
liberation war created structures not conducive for democratic development during 
post-independence. The EPLF during the liberation war managed to unite and mobilise 
a multi-ethnic society against a powerful enemy. By being secretive and centralised 
around a few figures and being ruthless against dissent, the leadership managed to 
further mobilise Eritrea. Its strategy of self-reliance during the liberation war was 
another factor that contributed to its success. But the continuation of these features has 
been a hindrance for democratisation post-independence. The government’s failed 
economic policies are inextricably linked to its failures in the realm of politics 
exemplified by its policy on self-reliance. At the heart of these failures lies the ruling 
clique’s illiberal and intolerant attitudes, which makes them perceive everything not 
initiated by them as representing a threat to national security. 
 It is impossible to understand present Eritrea without studying the EPLF during 
the liberation war. The historical sociologist Tilly argues that politico-military 
organisations can be seen as mini-states. They are characterised by features that define 
the state. The organisations possess all the means of coercion and are very much 
reliant on these means of coercion to achieve their aims.173 The EPLF inherited these 
characteristics and treated post-independence Eritrea in many ways similarly the way 
it treated it during the liberation war. While the analysis puts the emphasis on the 
structures created by history, this does not by any means exonerate the actions of the 
ruling party. But with their total control over the state, what about the people of 
Eritrea? It is impossible to analyse a process towards popular control over public 
affairs, without analysing the Eritrean society. The next chapter will thoroughly 
discuss some important aspects of the Eritrean society and how these contributed to 
the failure of democratisation in Eritrea. 
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4. Society – A diverse population in a united state? 
 
 Eritrea can roughly be divided into two geographically entities, the kebessa, or 
highlands, and the metahit, or lowlands. The most accurate way to describe the 
different segments of the Eritrean population is in terms of ethno-linguistic 
characteristics.174 As mentioned in the introduction, there are officially nine different 
ethnic groups in Eritrea, with Tigrinya being the majority. This chapter will analyse 
how the role of the society and different actors within society have contributed to the 
failure of democratisation in Eritrea. It will look at the Eritrean society from a 
historical perspective to show how it has shaped political developments. This chapter 
is divided into four sections: The first will look at some general characteristics of the 
rural population in Eritrea, in particular the Tigrinya population. According to the 
Eritrean National Statistics and Evaluation Office, only 20% of Eritreans live in urban 
areas.175 The liberation war was first and foremost fought in the rural areas of Eritrea 
and the EPLF managed to mobilise most peasants from the Tigrinya highlands.176 It is 
thus important to examine the rural population in Eritrea. These generalisations do not 
give a complete account of the population, but can be useful in the understanding of 
Eritrean society. The second part will look at Eritrea’s history of domination and 
political organisations. The third part will consider the liberation struggle and observe 
how the liberation movements mobilised Eritreans. Having these three parts in mind, 
the fourth part will look at associational life in Eritrea today, in particular civil society 
and opposition movements. It will also argue that some central characteristics of the 
Tigrinya socio-cultural life have in fact contributed to the growth of a totalitarian 
regime.  
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4.1 Eritrea’s characteristics – Hierarchy, determinism and diversity 
 The Tigrinya culture stems from the Abyssinian tradition, referring to the 
historically dominant Orthodox Christian highland area where the languages of 
Amharic and Tigrinya are spoken. Due to the similar socio-cultural characteristics 
between Amhara and Tigrinya this part will also use the analyses of Lefort and 
Vaughan and Tronvoll, who mostly are concerned with Amharic culture, to describe 
the Tigrinya society. Both Lefort and Vaughan and Tronvoll emphasise a very 
hierarchical stratification of society amongst the highland peasants, where one is 
confined by a largely invisible but strict system of collective sanctions to obey orders 
from above. 177 This has imbued new generations with the cultural notion that people 
are unequal. Individuals are ranked according to certain criteria that give some people 
greater value than others.  
Moreover, any individuals should always be subservient to any other individual 
regarded as superior to oneself.178 In other words, you should not question your 
authority, as their word is the final word. After the devastating second war with 
Ethiopia, no one knew exactly many who had died. On Martyr’s Day 2003, three years 
after the second war with Ethiopia, Isaias announced that Eritrea had lost 19,000 
Eritreans in the war. The names were announced and families could now grieve for 
those they had lost.179 However, many of the families were told that their relatives died 
of injuries many months after the fighting. The families could in fact see them and 
give their last goodbye, but due to the government’s secrecy, this was never 
announced until 2003. Even then, Aardal told the author, no one would say one 
negative word about the government and their president. This illustrates the respect 
Eritrean citizens have for their superiors and more specifically their government.180 
The hierarchical system is also deterministic. There is an unshakeable belief in 
the omnipotence of God who dictates their whole existence. What happens is God’s 
will, so opposing something is opposing God, the highest authority. Power is 
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therefore, according to Lefort, divine by essence because like everything else, power 
ultimately proceeds from God. To obey is therefore to submit to God’s will. This 
notion of obeying encompasses the ruling party or the state and all their members and 
agents.181 An Amharic saying can be used to illustrate this: “The king who rules is my 
king”.182 
A third characteristic of Eritrean society is that it is diverse. As mentioned 
above, there are officially nine different ethnic groups in Eritrea.183 Until the 
establishment of the Italian centralised colonial administration, the ties that bound the 
various peoples of Eritrea had been based on kinship, lineage, culture and region.184 
According to Iyob it was only during the 1980s, when the single imperative of 
liberation from Ethiopian hegemonic control emerged to unite the Eritrean factions, 
that an all-encompassing nationalism was achieved.185 Eritrean nationalist discourse 
rarely projects a unified Eritrea into antiquity.186 Instead, it focuses on the 
transformation under Italian colonialism and stresses development through several 
stages, of a new identity based on common experiences, with the final stage of the 
liberation war as the decisive one.187 
These three features are important in different ways. Firstly, the hierarchical 
and deterministic view can lead to a practice where the leaders are not accountable to 
their citizens, but rather to those above them in the system. Secondly, the population is 
reluctant to challenge their superiors and act as checks and balances, which is vital in a 
democratic system. Thirdly, the diversity in Eritrea has historically been perceived as 
divisive and that can also explain the EPLF/PFDJ’s obsession with unity. Finally, and 
maybe most importantly, is how this is perceived at the top. Because the population is 
inferior to them, no one is allowed to question the leadership’s actions. As seen in the 
previous chapter this was common with the EPLF/PFDJ leadership during the 
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liberation war and post-independence. This can be found in the ideology of the party 
where the principle of having a vanguard enforces the hierarchical order. Having these 
three characteristics in mind, the chapter will now move on to analyse how the 
Eritrean society has experienced centuries of domination and how political 
organisation originated in Eritrea. 
4.2 History of domination – foreign intervention and political organisation 
 When Italy officially established the colony of Eritrea in 1890, it gave birth to 
the concept of Eritrea we know today.188 Within this concept of Eritrea were different 
ethnic groups, with different religions and languages. Already at this time the area and 
the population in what we now call Eritrea189 had experienced external forces invading 
from both the Ethiopian kingdom and the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, it was not 
until Italy arrived that Eritrea as a geographical entity was created. Moreover, one 
Italian impact was the evolution of a distinct identity on the basis of the growing gap 
between the socio-economic realities of Eritrea and Ethiopia. “In the 1930s”, Negash 
and Tronvoll argues, “the Italians had propagated the view that Italian rule had 
‘civilised [the Eritrean] people’, while Ethiopia and Ethiopians were described as 
backward […].”190 The Italian’s main impact was thus the creation of an Eritrean 
identity. 
With the end of Italian rule and the arrival of the British Military 
Administration (BMA), Eritreans were forced to interact with each other in forums of 
British making. The Eritreans were expected to act as a unit at a time when the 
majority of the inhabitants had not yet come to see themselves as part of an Eritrean 
nation.191 Furthermore, the Eritreans experienced, exploitation under Ethiopia’s Haile 
Selassie’s rule and the Derg after the BMA. Under each regime, peasants had been 
forced to fight in wars they did not believe in or understood, on behalf of the holder of 
power. According to Tronvoll, many peasants in Eritrea thus expressed gratitude to the 
                                                 
188	  Müller,	  Tanja	  R.	  (2005)	  p.	  28	  
189	  The	  name	  Eritrea	  comes	  from	  the	  Italians.	  Before	  that,	  the	  highland	  region	  was	  know	  as	  Mereb	  Melash	  (The	  
Land	  Beyond	  the	  [river]	  Mereb),	  or	  Medri	  Bahr	  (Land	  of	  the	  Sea)	  and	  Barka	  (lowlands),	  Semhar	  and	  Dankalia.	  
See	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2009)	  p.	  134	  
190	  Negash,	  Tekeste	  &	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2000)	  pp.	  8-­‐9	  
191	  Iyob,	  Ruth	  (1995)	  p.	  4	  
 52 
EPLF/PFDJ when they liberated Eritrea because it put a stop to the external forces 
fighting wars and exploiting the Eritreans for their own benefit.192 
 The EPLF/PFDJ was not the first political party in Eritrea. In fact, during the 
1940s and until the closure of the Eritrean parliament by Ethiopia in 1962, there were a 
number of organised political parties in Eritrea.193 The BMA took over the 
administration of Eritrea in May 1941, after the Italians’ capitulation in the Second 
World War. The BMA, acting as an interim government, tried to create an atmosphere 
in which all people in Eritrea could have a voice in determining their political future; 
union with Ethiopia or independence.194 Roughly, one can argue that a considerable 
part of the Tigrinya Christian population favoured union with Ethiopia and became 
organised in the Unionist Party. A large part of the lowland Muslim population 
favoured independence and became organised in the Independence Bloc with the 
Muslim League.195 While these attempts at organisation were somewhat of a success, 
the future of Eritrea was decided in the UN, which failed to satisfy either side.196 The 
decision, which will be further explored in the next chapter, was that Eritrea was to be 
federated into Ethiopia. 
 The Eritrean society has thus for most of their history been dominated and 
controlled by external forces. When they were allowed to organise politically to voice 
their opinions, the result was even more domination. There are two consequences that 
should be emphasised here: The first is the one briefly touched upon above. After so 
many years of external intervention, Eritreans showed gratefulness when their own 
people had liberated their areas and successively made their country independent. This 
again may have resulted in a loyalty to the EPLF/PFDJ that made them build a country 
on their own terms without many people questioning the authorities. Secondly, while 
in fact Eritrea had a tradition of multi-party politics during the 1940s and 50s, the 
result of this process did not satisfy the Eritreans at the time as outside forces dictated 
their future anyway. As the last period of organisational politics in Eritrea resulted in 
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federation with Ethiopia, the PFDJ have another incentive to postpone elections 
because the citizens are not yet ready for it. After all, the EPLF’s ultimate goal was 
national sovereignty, thus choosing federation with Ethiopia was the wrong choice. 
  
4.3 Mobilising the Eritreans – Peasants in the Liberation struggle 
 After the annexation to Ethiopia, the liberation war began. The challenge in 
societies like Eritrea is often to politically involve peasants. As they are more 
preoccupied with the conditions of the crops in the field than national issues, they are 
not likely to rebel. Wolf notes that most poor peasants are unlikely initiators of 
rebellion. They are usually dependent upon or closely tied to landlords and do not 
rebel unless outside forces intervene to mobilise and shield them.197 This was also the 
case in Eritrea. Tronvoll writes that the civilian villagers were not preoccupied with 
the national sphere, but rather focused on their share of land, and the conditions of the 
crops.198 With approximately 80 percent of the Eritrean population living in the rural 
areas, it was thus key to mobilise the peasantry to gain sufficient strength to fight.  The 
ELF was not very centralised and let the different ethnic and religious identities live 
within the movement. When ELF started to fall apart (see previous chapter) the EPLF 
grew as the major liberation front in Eritrea. The EPLF had a different strategy:  
 Being a product of the division within Eritrean nationalism in the past, the 
EPLF had to reconcile these divisions and forge a sense of national consciousness, 
while at the same time appeal to and mobilise the major social classes within both the 
Muslim and the Christian spectrum of society.199 Based on a unifying ideological 
framework, the EPLF introduced to its members to a programme of political education 
that shaped the consciousness of Front members. Acceptance of this education was as 
much a symbol of organisational commitment as the carrying of a gun.200 The 
mobilisation was a result of a larger social revolution that for instance gave access to 
land, increased gender equality and abolished church control amongst the peasantry. 
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This was, as has been mentioned before, done to remove religious, gender and ethnic 
divisions in the Eritrean society and to strengthen the goal of national unity. According 
to Müller, great emphasis was given to the rewriting of Eritrean history. Using Marxist 
and Maoist concepts, language divisions within society were portrayed as class 
divisions and thus the notion of religion and tribe as important social entities were 
undermined by the concept of nationality as the main cultural category.201 This new 
interpretation of Eritrean nationalist history made the EPLF impervious to social, 
ethnic, regional, tribal, religious and ideological division.202 In other words, the EPLF 
had a broader social agenda, not just a nationalist agenda. 
 With the EPLF’s expansion into Eritrean society and its capacity to turn 
political and military adversity to its advantage, this new national consciousness 
spread to parts of the wider population. Needless to say, the mobilisation was not 
always a voluntary conscription. Many peasants described recruitment and 
participation with a ‘push model’ in mind, saying that they had no other option, if they 
were to survive, than to join the struggle or seek refugee status in some neighbouring 
country.203 The nationalist ideology was learned within the Front and not something 
initiated in the Eritrean population. As a result, according to Tronvoll, a strong 
nationalist sentiment was generated through the prolonged fighting.204 
 The goal of achieving national sovereignty, and as part of the wider social 
revolution, the EPLF created a space for civil society affiliated with it. But the 
organisations were created by the EPLF to mobilise and direct the masses. They thus 
created organisations affiliated with the Front, not independent from them. The EPLF 
formed a worker’s union, peasant’s union, women’s union and youth union. This will 
be further explored further down, but the main point here is that they strengthened 
these groups’ role in society. This again would give the EPLF further legitimacy in 
Eritrea. Additionally, the EPLF’s success in mobilising large parts of the Eritrean 
population depended as much on the social transformation of Eritrean society as on the 
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strength of its military wing.205 It should be emphasised that solidarity was also 
military enforced, as mentioned above with the “push model”.  
 The EPLF and their ideological framework to create a political consciousness of 
nationalism evolving around the ultimate goal of national sovereignty thus managed to 
subdue divisions in the Eritrean society and unite them towards the goal of 
independence. “The EPLF became thus an organisation which moulded Eritreans 
rather than one buffeted by Eritrean socio-historic divisions,” Müller argues.206 
Whereas this strategy to an extent successfully mobilised peasants and other parts of 
Eritrean society, the negative consequences of the transformation of society have 
become more and more apparent post-independence. In particular, the associational 
life suffered in Eritrea. 
 
4.4 Autonomy and influences – Civil society and Opposition movements 
 The nature of the state-society relation, and the role and place of civil society in 
Eritrea, was governed by the need to work towards the achievement of a common goal, 
namely national sovereignty. Not to distinguish and defend society against the 
unfettered intervention of the state.207 Young argues that civil society constructed out 
of liberated areas and militarily enforced solidarity was different from the kind that 
emerges from voluntary associations and electoral campaigns.208 To understand civil 
society in Eritrea today, we have to look at the society’s historical development. As 
mentioned earlier, to further mobilise the Eritrean population in order to gain support 
in the liberation war, the EPLF formed mass organisations that could actively organise 
and strengthen the front through education and transforming the society according to 
the Front’s ideology. The EPLF formed a worker’s, peasant’s, women’s and a youth 
union, all of them controlled by Front. The mass organisations adopted a very tight 
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partnership with the EPLF and further promoted the ultimate goal of the Front – 
national sovereignty.209 
 Suttner argues that national liberation movements have generally seen 
organisations outside the umbrella of the movement as divisive and even aiding 
enemies of national unity. The national liberation movement model is collectivist and 
totalising, thus differentiation and deviation are always seen as profane and divisive.210 
The EPLF thus maintained close control over the mass organisations during the 
liberation war. According to Bereketeab, the autonomy of the civil society 
organisations in Eritrea at this time was severely curtailed, not only due to the total 
control of the EPLF, but also due to self-imposed censorship by the mass 
organisations. It was understood that the EPLF, as agents of independence, were 
prerequisites for the existence and functions of the civil society, hence the mass 
organisations followed the guidelines set by the EPLF.211 
 After independence these organisations, instead of transforming into 
autonomous bodies that represent the will of their members and oppose State policies 
that negatively affect their members, continued to function as extensions of the EPLF 
implementing the Front’s policies and decisions.212 The reason for this was that since 
they were formed as an extension of the Front during the liberation war, they felt a 
strong sense of loyalty. Bereketeab notes “they continued to perceive their role as 
lending a supporting hand to the government in its efforts towards national 
reconstruction and nation-state building.”213 It was thus not only the state that was not 
willing to let civil society associations be autonomous, but also the self-imposed 
discipline and adherence to the ultimate goal of national unity that impeded these 
associations’ autonomy.  
 Civil society, defined as autonomous organisations that defend society against 
the unfettered intervention of the state, is non-existent in Eritrea. The only 
organisations in Eritrea today are not only closely affiliated with the ruling party, but 
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led by the leaders of the ruling party.214 These organisations can thus be termed a 
government organised NGO, or GONGO. Other groups trying to emerge post-
independence have been perceived as divisive if they did not want to be affiliated with 
the ruling party and its ideology. Even the National Union of Eritrean Peasants 
(NUEP), which during the war was vital for the EPLF, was abolished in 1994 because 
they did not comply with the government’s policies.215 Kibreab argues that the 
Eritrean government had in fact rejected the idea of an autonomous civil society from 
the outset. In 1992, the government issued a legal notice requiring all national, non-
profit-making humanitarian NGOs to register and apply for permission from the 
ministry of interior. Any organisation or association failing to do so would be barred 
from humanitarian activities.216 
This also proved difficult for religious groups and churches. These 
organisations have a long history predating the birth of the Eritrean state and had huge 
numbers of followings. Moreover, these groups had no roots in the liberation 
struggle.217 In 1995, the government issued a proclamation stipulating that the state is 
prohibited from interfering in religious affairs, inasmuch as faith-based organisations 
are forbidden from interfering in national politics. Since the term politics was not 
defined in the proclamation, most acts of civic engagement by faith-based 
organisations can be interpreted as being political. Furthermore, faith-based 
organisations and religious institutions are banned from advocacy, campaigning, 
protesting and preaching on social justice issues.218 The attempt at constraining 
religious groups and institutions can be explained by looking at the totalising nature 
Suttner speaks about. Since these groups had so many followers and no roots in the 
liberation struggle, the government believed that it could not realise its goals and 
achieve total control without stifling the autonomy and activities of the faith-based 
organisations.219 The Catholic Church, for instance, answered to the Vatican. As a 
                                                 
214	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  p.	  56	  
215	  Ibid.	  p.	  57	  
216	  Ibid	  p.	  61	  
217	  Bereketeab,	  Redie	  (2009a)	  p.	  45	  
218	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  p.	  89	  
219	  Kibreab,	  Gaim	  (2009a)	  
 58 
consequence, the government threw out Italian nuns because they answered to another 
power than the Eritrean government.  
Nevertheless, religious groups are not necessarily the most vocal organisations 
in Eritrea. The government subsidised the Eritrean Orthodox Church and accorded it 
unique privileges, like exclusive tax exemption and buildings. The financial 
incentives, Kibreab argues, were given to the Orthodox Church as a means of 
exercising political control. In return, the government expected absolute loyalty and 
subservience.220 It is worth noting that the Orthodox Church has throughout its history 
given divine legitimacy to the leaders of the territory, receiving privileges in return. 
The PFDJ’s treatment of the Orthodox Church, and the Church’s support is thus not 
something unique to Eritrea’s period as a sovereign country. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, when the Orthodox Church leaders protested 
against the government the government took drastic and coercive measures. The 
coercive methods of dealing with critique from religious groups have silenced them. 
On the other side of the coin, the Orthodox Church continues to give legitimacy to the 
government, and today the four big religious groups are either silent or loyal to the 
government.221 
Being silent and loyal when people suffer can be hard. Furthermore, when one’s 
grievances are met with violence and repression, some groups might in fact use other 
methods to get their voice heard. In Eritrea, attempts from opposition parties or other 
civil society actors to have a say in Eritrean society are counteracted by the state. This 
exclusionary culture, according to Vaughan and Tronvoll who write about Ethiopia, 
leads to a polarisation of public political debate. The government and opposition do 
not enter into dialogue on issues, but tend to be entrenched in their own inwardly 
informed political positions, from which they communicate against each other.222 The 
same culture can be identified in Eritrea where the government is not interested in 
other people defining or even contributing to a political agenda. One outcome of such 
polarisation is the channelling of political opposition through other means than 
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peaceful statements and rallies. Additionally, one distinguishing feature of these 
groups is that they hold grudges against the PFDJ and hope for revenge.223 
The government’s failure to listen to other groups and the politics of revenge by 
opposition groups are not good signs for democratic development. It is a vicious circle 
that further impedes the Eritrean society’s involvement in Eritrean politics and further 
removes all signs of checks and balances. Additionally, the politics of revenge is also 
believed to be one of the reasons pushing the opposition to ally with Ethiopia.224 As a 
result the Eritrean government support its neighbours’ opposition groups. This will be 
further explored in the next chapter. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 To summarise, this chapter has analysed how the role of society and different 
agents within society fits into the political development in Eritrea. It has tried to 
emphasise both the important features of the Eritrean society, as well as different 
agents working within it. This chapter has showed that if one were to barely focus on 
the state one would have an insufficient picture of the political development in Eritrea. 
State power is not only an attribute of the state machinery, but also a product of the 
interaction between the state’s ruling elite and all of its citizens.225 This analysis has 
first tried to give a general account of the Eritrean society. By highlighting hierarchy 
and determinism as two central elements of society, it is easier to understand both 
bottom-up and top-down behaviour. Bottom-up in the sense that many citizens have a 
high respect for authority. A Tigrinya proverb “any sun that rises is our sun and any 
king that ascends the throne is our king”226 expresses this type of sentiment. Top-down 
in the sense that authorities have a strong propensity to think that the peasants must 
carry out orders from above because the authorities think they know best. The idea of a 
vanguard further ideologically strengthened the ideological hierarchical order amongst 
the Eritrean leaders. 
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 Eritreans had a history of being ruled by external powers before fighting the 30-
year liberation war. So when Eritreans liberated their country, it is clear that many 
showed an almost blind support towards the liberation front and the newly established 
government. This can also explain how the government could control Eritrea with an 
iron fist without many questioning the leadership. “There is no doubt”, Kibreab writes, 
“that a considerable proportion of the Eritrean people placed a lot of trust in the EPLF 
government in the immediate post-independence period.”227 This section also touched 
upon a democratic period of Eritrean history and Bereketeab argues that no period 
matched this period in the proliferation of associational life.228 Nevertheless, one 
consequence of the political organisation in the 40s and 50s was a federation with 
Ethiopia. The fact that this occurred the last time people had multi-party politics 
illuminates the government’s fear that such sentiment is still lingering and may also 
explain why Isaias, still today, talks about ‘the people not being ready for multi-party 
politics’.229 
 With the two first sections in mind the third section in this chapter analysed 
how the EPLF mobilised Eritreans to fight for liberation and national sovereignty. 
Most communities run their own business and are not interested in big politics. But 
through a major operation of mobilisation, the EPLF managed not only to recruit 
soldiers from the rural areas, but also to transform large parts of the Eritrean society 
through its cultural, social and ideological education. The particularity defining Eritrea 
was that everything was directed towards the achievement of national sovereignty. Its 
primary purpose was overthrowing the yoke of oppression that required mobilisation 
of every section of society.230 
 The mobilisation was also the genesis of the big GONGOs in Eritrea that today 
is the only thing that can resemble a civil society. The liberation era mass 
organisations supported the government in its post-liberation national reconstruction 
by simply redefining their functions and structures. The submissiveness of these 
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organisations was due to historical reasons and the legacy of the liberation struggle. 
“The historical fact that they were formed as filial to the mother organisation, the 
EPLF, engendered a strong sense of loyalty” Bereketeab writes.231 Webster et al. 
argues that in a transition phase it is vital to emphasise popular capacity building and 
organisation building, and a government that is ready to dedicate itself to facilitating 
popular representation.232 The Eritrean government’s obsession with national unity 
impeded these processes post-independence and, as a result, hindered democratic 
development. Furthermore, the EPLF/PFDJ’s mobilisation transformed the large parts 
of society where unity and submissiveness are dominant aspects of the Eritrean 
society. The submissiveness from so many parts of the Eritrean society has contributed 
to the lack of checks and balances that is so important in a democratisation process. 
The government’s way of dealing with dissent and opinions not in line with its 
ideological values has of course worsened the development of any types of popular 
control over public affairs. Dissenters are often accused of being foreign spies and the 
next chapter will now further analyse how external relations fit into the political 
development in Eritrea. 
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5. External Relations – Actual, perceived and construed threats 
 
As mentioned in the theory chapter, state development must be analysed by 
looking at how international forces and regional actors try to influence domestic state 
policies and how the state reacts to these influences. Eritrea is a small country in a 
region that has been dominated by violence for centuries.233 Eritrea as an independent 
state is the result of thirty years of violence. And since independence Eritrea has had 
armed conflicts with Sudan, Yemen, and Ethiopia and twice with Djibouti.234 
Furthermore, Isaias has railed against the UN, the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU).235 The US and the EU have lost 
patience with Eritrea. And the Eritrean government only recently announced that “no 
UN agency will be allowed to freely and directly approach the beneficiary agents 
[…].”236 
This chapter seeks to analyse how external relations can explain the failed 
democratisation in Eritrea. It is important to understand the difference between foreign 
policy and external relations. While Eritrea itself is solely responsible for its foreign 
policies, external relations imply an intricate relationship where different actors’ 
behaviour affects each other. The chapter will first seek to analyse the relations Eritrea 
has with the international community and Ethiopia. While Eritrea is perceived as a 
political pariah, a regional spoiler,237 and isolated from the rest of the world, it is 
important to understand the Eritrean government’s behaviour in relation to external 
actors. For instance, there are many arrests in Eritrea where the government accuses 
alternative voices of being Ethiopian or CIA agents.238 It is important to understand 
that the first parts of this chapter, that is the international community and Ethiopia, are 
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an attempt to understand the EPLF/PFDJ’s worldview. It is not just an account of how 
the international community and Ethiopia behaved towards Eritrea and the 
EPLF/PFDJ, but also how this behaviour was perceived by the EPLF/PFDJ. This 
worldview is vital to have established if one wants to understand how external 
relations have affected the democratisation process in Eritrea. It is of special 
importance as the government uses foreign influence as reasons for impeding the 
democratic process they promised at the time of independence. Subsequently, on the 
basis of the first part, the remainder of this chapter will establish some characteristics 
of Eritrean foreign policy and analyse how external relations have subdued the 
democratic development in Eritrea. It is worth noting that this chapter first and 
foremost deals with states’ relations. On the Horn of Africa there are a large amount of 
insurgent groups fighting for self-determination or other reasons. This has an effect on 
the democratisation process in the sense that according to the Eritrean government, 
they constitute a threat to their core value, national unity. However, since this chapter 
is concerned with the Eritrean state and their relations with other states, this factor will 
only be dealt with briefly when discussing Eritrea’s foreign policy.239 
 
5.1 The International Community 
 Eritrea can be considered as a “pawn in world politics”.240 After fifty years of 
Italian colonial rule, Eritrea became a British military protectorate in 1941. It was the 
four major powers at that time that took upon themselves the task of deciding the 
destiny of ex-Italian colonial territories. They however, failed to decide and the task 
was referred to the United Nations. After two years of intense deliberations, the UN 
voted to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia.241 It should be noted, that while scholars like 
Bereketeab and Mengisteab242 focus on that the UN decision was contrary Eritrea’s 
wish, Sorenson points out that there was a support for unification. The unionists and 
those favouring independence were also given the opportunity to share their opinions 
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although with complications.243 There was considerable support for unification with 
Ethiopia in Eritrea, but it was the international community that decided Eritrea’s 
future. This is also how the PFDJ’s leadership see it. 
But the decision should also be viewed in context with the US policy at that 
time. In fact, the United States during that period saw the integration of Eritrea into the 
Ethiopian empire as consistent with its stated goal of Eritrea and Ethiopia forming one 
single strategic entity on which the realisation of America’s regional objective 
seemingly rested.244 Thus, when Ethiopia unilaterally abrogated the federal 
arrangement and annexed Eritrea, the US did not protest. It did in fact, as Mengisteab 
and Yohannes states, “readily endorse Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea by militarily 
and financially contributing towards the pacification. Between 1953 and 1969, US 
military assistance to Ethiopia amounted to $147 million, which was half of the total 
US military aid for all sub-Saharan Africa, supplemented by another $195.1 million in 
economic aid.”245 Furthermore, Ethiopia’s violation of the federal arrangement 
provoked no response from the UN, although the UN was mandated to guarantee the 
federation.246 
 During the Cold War, the EPLF did not receive much support because of the 
dynamics of the two superpowers. Because of its strategic location not only the US 
supported Ethiopia in its attempts to pacify the EPLF and other liberation movements. 
By the mid-1970s the US lost its interest in that area as it had built a large base on the 
island Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. This change, along with the regime change in 
Ethiopia that brought the Marxist military dictatorship of Mengistu to power led to the 
closure of US patronage of Ethiopia. The Soviet Union replaced the US as the main 
provider of military assistance, supplying it with over $11 billion in armaments 
between 1977 and 1991.247 As has been mentioned in previous chapters, the EPLF thus 
had to rely on themselves in their fight against their neighbour supported by the 
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superpowers. Furthermore, while the EPLF fought for Eritrean independence, the 
international community did not bring up the case of independence. Thus, the 
liberation war was characterised by the superpowers’ support to Ethiopia and no 
support for the independence of Eritrea. 
 At the time of independence, the international community had only high praises 
for the new African state, mainly due to their democratic rhetoric and absence of 
foreign debt. Isaias was hyped as a leader belonging to the ‘new breed of African 
leaders’, destined to shepherd the ‘African renaissance’ to new heights.248 In fact, 
Eritrea and its government, at this time, received unconditional financial support and 
help in demobilising its soldiers. This fact, which seems to be totally ignored by the 
Eritrean government, resulted in the international community giving the EPLF free 
reins on how to govern. 
 Furthermore, the international community did not improve its reputation in 
Eritrea after the second Eritrea-Ethiopia war in 1998-2000. More than a decade after 
the end of the devastating border war, the boundary problem between the two 
countries remains unresolved. Territories that were adjudged to belong to Eritrea by 
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) still remain under Ethiopian 
occupation.249 The Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship will be further explored later on in 
this chapter. The point to highlight here is the international community’s inertia to 
bring Ethiopia to comply with the ruling of the EEBC. First, the AU and the UN, who 
were the guarantors of the Algiers Treaty, have not been able to get Ethiopia to give up 
the territories. Second, the US, a witness of the Algiers Treaty failed to put the 
necessary pressure on Ethiopia to bring about Ethiopia’s compliance.  
 In addition, Eritrea has never had high opinion of the AU, formerly OAU. 
During the Eritrean liberation struggle, the OAU sided with Ethiopia, perceiving the 
Eritrean struggle as a separatist movement that was seeking the destruction of a 
sovereign state.250 Most African anti-colonial movements and other movements such 
as the Palestine Liberation Organisation received proto-state membership and status in 
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international organisations, but the Eritrean cause was not recognised 
internationally.251 With the absence of the OAU’s support, other international 
organisations and major powers did not support the Eritrean cause either. The 
contempt for OAU is illustrated by Isaias speech to the organisation when he stated 
that “to mince our words now and applaud the OAU would neither serve the desired 
purpose of learning lessons from our past, nor reflect positively on our honesty and 
integrity”.252 The AU/OAU is also one of the guarantors of the Algiers Treaty, but it 
failed to criticise Ethiopia for its failure to implement the EEBC ruling. As a result, the 
Eritrean government regards the OAU/AU as incapable and indifferent to issues 
affecting Eritrea. 
The EEBC border ruling also emphasises the importance of international law. 
The Eritrean government, after a conflict with Yemen, accepted an international 
arbitration decision. The Eritrean government also accepted the EEBC ruling. But 
since the US was not willing to take punitive measures against Ethiopia, or even to 
exert the necessary pressure, the other guarantors and witnesses to the Treaty also put 
little pressure on Ethiopia.253 One can thus understand the Eritrean government’s 
suspicion towards the international community’s decisions since they have failed to 
support something they constantly advocate - international law.  
In the Eritrean government’s mind, there is a clear line of continuity from the 
imperial machines of Italy and Britain in the nineteenth century, to the wilful 
ignorance of the UN, which overrode Eritrea wishes in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
to the lack of international support for the liberation struggle, to the perceived254 
inertia of the international community during and after the 1998-2000 war with 
Ethiopia.255 Furthermore the Washington’s response to Ethiopia’s non-compliance 
with the 2002 EEBC’s findings is viewed by Eritreans as another slight in a consistent 
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pattern. This goes back to Washington’s failure to protest against Emperor Haile 
Selassie’s abrogation of the 1950 UN resolution that federated Eritrea to Ethiopia in 
the first place. This lengthy experience of neglect fuels popular anger towards the 
United States and encourages anti-American attitudes and actions in Eritrea.256 
At the time of writing, Eritrea is under UN sanctions because of their 
involvement in Somalia and supposedly the next report from the UN Monitoring 
Group on Somalia due in July will produce more evidence about Eritrean support for 
the Somali rebels.257 While Eritrea objects to this258, it is important to understand the 
post-9/11 global environment. The US has justified the War on Terror in terms not 
unlike those invoked by Eritrean authorities when defending policies and practices as 
essential to national security. Thus, sovereign statehood today is more than the ability 
to defend national interest and territory against enemies both external and internal to 
the state. It also is the capacity to intervene in other struggles and societies for short-
sighted national interests.259 In other words, it is easy to recognise what the Eritrean 
government perceives as hypocrisy from the international community when it is 
sanctioned for actions when other states receive support for what it argues are similar 
actions. Moreover, Ethiopia is the US ally and as a result, Ethiopia has been allowed to 
behave with certain impunity in the region.260 
 Eritrea can arguably be termed a pawn in world politics. This is at least how the 
government argues it was treated. Eritrea is by no means excused for its aggressive 
foreign policy and internal totalitarian character. Nevertheless, this section shows that 
Eritrea has been subjected to foreign exploitation, received little international support 
during their liberation struggle and experienced the international community’s double 
standards. It is against this background that one can understand the current Eritrean 
regime’s suspicion towards the international community. However, Eritrea has not 
always been a pawn. For instance, during independence it did receive a large amount 
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of support from the international community. Its lack of diplomatic skills may be what 
pushed it further away from donors and international support. Needless to say, on the 
basis of what has been analysed in this section, the Eritrean government has a 
fundamental belief in the treachery and deception of the international community, 
which is seen to have failed to enforce the findings of EEBC and gone to great lengths 
to accommodate Ethiopia. This has also several implications for the domestic political 
situation, which this chapter will return to later. However, Eritrea’s political situation 
must also be viewed in context with another external factor – Ethiopia. 
 
5.2 The Ethiopia Factor 
 On 12 March, this year, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi promised to 
work “politically or through other means towards changing Eritrea’s policies or its 
government.”261 Whereas once Meles Zenawi was an ideological and military ally of 
Isaias, today they are bitter enemies and determined to get rid of each other rather than 
make peace.262 To understand this relationship, one needs to view it from a historical 
perspective. This section will look at the aspiration to be the regional hegemon and the 
ideological ideas and relationship between EPLF and the Ethiopian counterpart, the 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).  
Ethiopian leaders, the emperors of the ‘modern monarchy’ 1894-1974, the 
Mengistu regime 1974-1991 and Meles Zenawi all came to see their country as the 
regional hegemon. This is no coincidence, Iyob argues, since the heads of state had 
always assumed that the peoples of the Horn should be their vassals, and at various 
times during Ethiopia’s history, they had been.263 Ethiopia has thus always perceived 
itself as the dominant power in the region and as a result has acted accordingly. The 
problem is that the EPLF perceived itself as the big brother in the relationship with the 
TPLF. As the TPLF grew larger, they started challenging the EPLF’s ideas and 
strategies more explicit. This was one reason why the two fronts started disagreeing 
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with each other and has followed the two fronts up to present day. Today, both the 
Eritrean and the Ethiopian government aspire to be the regional hegemon. As a result, 
neither wishes to see the other part to increase its power in the region.  
 In 1975, the EPLF established a partnership with their Ethiopian counterpart, 
the TPLF, later led by Meles Zenawi, to fight the Mengistu regime. However, from the 
very outset of their relationship tensions arose. The TPLF’s 1976 manifesto declared 
its intentions to establish a Greater Tigray Republic. According to the TPLF, the 
economic, social and political problems of Ethiopia were due to the suppression of the 
different ethnic groups.264 Thus, the TPLF’s cause for struggle for independence was 
an independent republic of Tigray. The territory of Tigray was to include Eritrean 
areas. This was fundamentally different from the EPLF’s view, which sought to build 
a unitary Eritrea devoid of ethnic differences. In their view, the TPLF should define 
their struggle as the establishment of a democratic Ethiopia.265 Throughout the 1970s 
and the beginning of the 1980s, the TPLF grew in size and felt it was strong enough to 
break out of its junior role in the relationship.266 They wanted the principle of self-
determination, that ethnic groups should control their own areas, should be applied to 
Eritrea too. For instance, the Afar should be able to exercise the right of self-
determination within Eritrea. This was perceived by the EPLF as an assault on the idea 
of Eritrean territory and nationhood.267 
 Whereas the relationship between the EPLF and the TPLF continued throughout 
the liberation struggle, they were fundamentally different from each other. Their 
relationship was “a marriage of necessity [rather] than a marriage of love”268. The 
EPLF needed support from the TPLF in its claim for national independence, while the 
TPLF depended on the EPLF’s support to gain and remain in control of the country.269 
Following the collapse of the Mengistu regime the two liberation fronts took over 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. But their relationship was undermined by the two sides’ 
irreconcilable expectations. According to Bereketeab, Eritrea sought to benefit from 
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the Ethiopian market in order to consolidate its independence while Ethiopia aimed at 
political union.270 These fundamental differences were never attempted to be resolved, 
and by 1998 the two countries began a devastating war thought to have claimed an 
estimated 70,000 to 100,000 deaths and displaced hundreds of thousands of peoples on 
both sides of the border.271 
 Following a June 2000 ceasefire agreement, the two countries signed an 
internationally brokered agreement in Algiers. The Algiers Treaty established a 
ceasefire, created a Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and the EEBC to delimit the 
border. In April 2002, the EEBC issued its determination, but Ethiopia did not accept 
the modality of implementation.272 Because international law supports its position, 
Eritrea believes that the international community should force Ethiopia to comply with 
the final and binding decision, whereas Ethiopia feels no need to alter the status quo.273 
Today, the two countries fight each other through proxy wars, by supporting the 
other’s foes with weapons, safe havens and soldiers.274 The Ethiopian factor has thus 
wider regional implications, which are not the focus of this study, but it has also huge 
implications on Eritrea. With the international community and Ethiopia as background, 
this chapter will now turn to Eritrea and its foreign policy 
5.3 Eritrea – Foreign policies 
 Eritrea’s foreign policy, as with many other aspects of the state, can be traced 
back to the liberation war. The first aspect is the government’s powerful sense of 
isolation and having been betrayed during the liberation war. Since the EPLF’s main 
goal was a united, independent Eritrea it is clear that the international community’s 
decisions were perceived as being a betrayal to Eritreans and their nation. As 
Bereketeab argues, to a very real extent, Eritrea’s isolationist stance is dictated 
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historically by the perception of external injustices.275 This lack of trust in the 
international community is also inextricably linked to the Eritrean government’s policy 
of self-reliance. This policy during the liberation war emphasised that a victory could 
only be achieved by drawing on its own strength and resources and minimising foreign 
influence and dependency and remains present in Eritrean government policy today, in 
particular in relations with the international donor community.276 In a letter to UN 
Humanitarian Coordinator the Eritrean government states that: “national development 
will never be materialised if it is done by depending on grant financing from UN 
agencies […]. It is widely believed that aid only postpones the basic solutions to 
crucial development problems [and] the structural, political, economic etc. damage 
that it inflicts upon recipient countries is also enormous.”277 Feeling betrayed by the 
international community time and time again, as well as perceiving that they achieved 
independence more or less without any external support, thus explains the 
EPLF/PFDJ’s hostility towards international donors and their self-reliance policy.  
 Another factor that dominates Eritrea foreign policy is their focus on national 
sovereignty. After achieving independence against all odds the Eritrean government 
was concerned with securing its borders and maintaining independence and internal 
political order against foreign and domestic threats.278 Against this backdrop, Eritrea 
became involved in armed conflict with its neighbours in order to defend what they 
perceived as competing claims to parts of Eritrean territory.279 For the government, 
Connell argues, the best defence of Eritrea’s borders against hostile acts by 
neighbouring states or by opposition groups based in them is the creation and support 
of effective insurgent forces that will challenge their neighbours from within.280 
Eritrea’s imperative of national survival leads it to assume the role of what Iyob terms 
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“diasporic state.”281 According to Iyob, a diasporic state has a quest for a nation of 
one’s own against a hegemonic state. This quest is formulated as the right of a people 
to struggle for self-determination and protection from future victimisation.282 Eritrea’s 
position as a diasporic state thus made them react aggressively to all perceived threats 
against its nation and territory. Looking back at Eritrea’s relationship with Ethiopia 
and the latter’s regional dominance and ideology of ethnic groups’ right to self-
determination, one can acknowledge the fear that the Eritrean government has against 
the Ethiopian government’s influence in Eritrea.  
  
5.4 External relations and democratisation 
The external elements outlined here are complicated, but as was mentioned in 
the beginning of this chapter, external relations are directly linked with internal 
politics. Thus, this chapter has first analysed Eritrea’s worldview and external 
relations. To what extend has Eritrea’s external relations affected the democratisation 
in Eritrea? First, as Eritrea can be termed a diasporic state, it has an extreme focus on 
securing its territory and nationality. Thus when there is, for instance, Islamic 
opposition on the Sudanese borders, the Eritrean government see it as threatening its 
secular policies. Another example is Ethiopia and its perceived imperial interests in 
Eritrea. Thus, the Eritrean government believes any Eritrean with grievances that do 
not coincide with its policies is an enemy. Iyob emphasises that a diasporic state risks 
whatever democratic credentials it builds up in order to eliminate opponents to its 
survival.283 The EPLF/PFDJ’s legitimacy was gained because it performed a military 
miracle in gaining independence and promised stability, security, socio-economic 
development, liberty and democracy under the banner of the core value national unity 
(see chapter 3).284 After the second war with Ethiopia these promises, and thus its 
legitimacy, were undermined. The loss of legitimacy led to pervasive oppression. 
More gravely, it seriously shook the core value of the PFDJ government, national 
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unity. Since the government is highly invested in national unity, any tampering with it 
is seen as being the same as demolishing the Eritrean state.285 As a result, Eritrea has 
since the second war with Ethiopia, had a de facto state of emergency that has been 
used to suppress all expression of dissent. Elections were postponed, the 
implementation of the constitution was put on hold and mass conscriptions were re-
instated. In other words, since the newly created state suddenly lost a war against 
Ethiopia, which they had previously defeated in 1991, the Eritrean government 
tightened its grip on Eritrean society in order to secure its core value. 
With its legacy from the liberation war, Eritrea, as with most others states in the 
region, sees diplomacy as a continuation of war by other means.286 In other words, the 
Eritrean government has to some extent a war-mentality, and as a result, a tendency to 
identify people who disagree with their ideology as enemies who threaten its 
existence. This does not only include defending its territory from its regional foes, but 
also from the political and economic exigencies of neoliberal globalisation from the 
West.287 The international community, and in particular the influences of the West are 
looked at with suspicion and to cope with such global influences requires internal 
discipline similar to that which helped free Eritrea from Ethiopian rule.288 The 
government’s oppressive behaviour can thus also be explained as a means of insuring 
that the ‘Eritreaness’ is upheld against external influences, which has done nothing but 
cause harm to Eritrea, the abovementioned letter illustrates this perspective.  
Furthermore, the need for discipline and the need to reinforce the PFDJ’s 
legitimacy have affected the democratic development in another way as well: it 
militarised the Eritrean society. Eritrea today has 200,000 soldiers, plus 200,000-
250,000 conscripts.289 With its small population Eritrea competes with North Korea as 
the world’s most militarised country.290 Conscription helps the PFDJ to keep down 
dissent, restrain fractious students, reduces unemployment and provides unpaid labour 
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for state companies and senior officers.291 According to Human Rights Watch, in 2002 
a national social and economic development effort was announced. The national 
service of 18 months was indefinitely extended so that all male and female adults must 
be available to work at the direction of the state in various capacities until the age of 
40.292 This conscription is an apparatus used to enforce the core value in a non-
democratic way and avoid any external influence or invasion.293 
Finally, the international community’s unconditional support at the time of 
independence impeded the democratic development. By giving the EPLF free reins to 
govern, rather than functioning as powerful checks and balances, the international 
community did not put further pressure on the EPLF, which could further help the 
EPLF in transforming itself into a democratic, civilian party. In particular, because the 
independent civil society was absent, a powerful international community could have 
assumed its role and worked as checks and balances in a very important phase of 
Eritrea’s democratisation process. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 To sum up, Eritrea’s failure to democratise needs to be seen in context with its 
external relations. Its de facto state of emergency, since the 1998-2000 war with 
Ethiopia, has totally reversed Eritrea’s democratic development. The implementation 
of the constitution has been put on hold, elections have been postponed indefinitely 
and any dissent is perceived as being a threat to the Eritrean national sovereignty - a 
sovereignty that has not received much support from the international community or 
its neighbours throughout history. In the beginning this chapter argued that while 
Eritrea itself is solely responsible for its foreign policies, external relations imply an 
intricate relationship where different actors’ behaviour affects each other. Therefore, 
the international community’s role was first analysed to more easily understand the 
Eritrean government’s worldview. Subsequently, this chapter analysed what has been 
termed the ‘Ethiopia factor’. Both the international community and Ethiopia have been 
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analysed in a historical perspective to understand the current hostility Eritrea has 
towards them.  
 Whether Eritrea is subject to an actual threat is not important. What is important 
is to understand how Eritrea perceives and construes external threats and reacts to 
them. As more than 60,000 fighters and 40,000 civilians died during the liberation 
war,294 and tens of thousands in the second war with Ethiopia, the Eritrean government 
has skilfully utilised these sacrifices by stating that it is the only true guarantor of 
Eritrean independence and that the opposition would squander it. As long as there is a 
perceived threat to the country’s independence, which is also partly reinforced by the 
Ethiopian government’s refusal to accept the ruling of the EEBC, many Eritreans seem 
to be willing to trade freedom and democracy for ‘security’. 295 
 Eritrea had crafted its identity through the liberation struggle and worshiped its 
freedom fighters. It understood its success in the independence struggle as a single-
handed military victory achieved against all odds. This engendered a sense of 
invincibility that made them see only military solutions when conflict arose. In the 
words of Information Minister Ali Abdu, Eritrea would kneel down for two reasons 
only: to pray or to shoot.296 When this sense of invincibility is combined with the ‘do 
not trust anyone’ mentality, the consequences are aggressive foreign policy and 
totalitarian domestic policies. After the devastating second war with Ethiopia, this 
sense of invincibility was challenged and without any help being offered from the 
international community, the government tightened its grip so that it could achieve its 
core value without any of its ‘enemies’ trying to destroy the Eritrean nation-state.  
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6. Summarising arguments and concluding remarks 
 The thesis began by quoting president Isaias to illustrate the research question: 
why has Eritrea failed to democratise? At the time of independence, many believed 
that Eritrea would develop into a democracy. It spoke about elections, started drafting 
a constitution and the international community was willing to support the government 
in their nation-state building. At the time of writing, however, Eritrea has turned into a 
totalitarian state and the democratic narrative in the beginning of the 1990s has been 
changed to “we are not ready for democracy.” To answer the research question, this 
thesis has used democratisation theory and created an eclectic framework that analyses 
the state, society and external relations to see how they have contributed to the failure 
of democratisation. This chapter will attempt to reassess the three elements to 
highlight how they have impeded the democratisation process in Eritrea. Subsequently, 
on the basis of the findings this chapter will return to the theoretical framework and 
discuss some theoretical implications.  
 
6.1 State, society and external relations – three intertwined elements 
 The state, which in this case is represented by the Eritrean government and the 
ruling party, the PFDJ, has been a major actor impeding democratic development in 
Eritrea. This thesis has analysed the PFDJ’s history and showed that it had failed to 
transform into a civilian democratic party. The EPLF during the liberation war 
managed to mobilise a multi-ethnic society against a powerful Ethiopia. By being 
secretive and centralised around a few figures and being ruthless against dissent, the 
leadership managed to further mobilise the people of Eritrea. Its strategy of self-
reliance during the liberation war was another factor that contributed to its success. 
But the continuation of these features has been a hindrance for democratisation post-
independence. First, sectarian grievances etc. have been subdued. Second, the idea of 
having a vanguard leading the masses has created a state wherein only a few people 
decide everything. At the centre are the president, a few selected advisors and their 
actions. Third, instead of letting people openly share their grievances and 
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disagreements, the government has dealt with it in the same way as it did during the 
liberation war. Finally, self-reliance and self-sacrifice is a main cause for poor 
economic performance, exclusion of the voluntary sector and international support to 
help boost the economy. The politics of self-reliance is a mechanism the state uses to 
control society. Various international NGOs and agencies have been kept out of 
Eritrea, and the state used this method to consolidate its power and prevent outsiders 
from observing conditions in the country.297 Additionally, self-sacrifice has made the 
government neglect many Eritreans’ poverty and hunger, as building Eritrea through 
the core value has been more important than taking care of individuals and their 
difficulties. At the heart of these failures lies the ruling clique’s illiberal and intolerant 
attitudes, which makes them perceive everything not initiated by them as representing 
a threat to the PFDJ’s hegemony. The PFDJ identifies itself as Eritrea and, according 
to the PFDJ, without the party Eritrea cannot survive. Thus a threat to the PFDJ’s 
hegemony in Eritrea is a threat to national security. National liberation movements in 
general have legacies that are not compatible with democratic development and there 
is thus a need to work hard to transform a liberation movement into a civilian party. 
This is where the PFDJ and its vanguard have failed. 
 Needless to say, to only focus on the state in a democratisation process is 
insufficient. Therefore, the second element of this study has been the Eritrean society.  
This study has highlighted some characteristics of the Eritrean society, which partly 
explains why the citizens have not been able to put more pressure on the government. 
The hierarchical structure states that any individual should always be subservient to 
another individual who is regarded as superior to them. But it does also explain the 
attitudes of the governing elite as they expect their citizens to be obedient citizens 
following the government’s plan. This has laid the basis of a system where the 
government is not accountable to its citizens, but rather the other way around. 
Moreover, after decades of war, it is clear that many citizens showed an unconditional 
support to the EPLF/PFDJ during the first few years.  
The development of a viral associational life, as one could see in the 40s and the 
50s, is now non-existent. Apart from the GONGOs in Eritrea, the only groups 
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opposing state policies and development live in exile or have turned to non-peaceful 
methods. The explanation to this can be traced back to the mobilisation of the 
Eritreans by the EPLF during the liberation war. But, in the same way that the state 
failed to transform into a civilian party, the mass organisations failed to develop into 
NGOs functioning as checks and balances to the government. They continued to have 
close links with the ruling party and have become a tool where the government can 
influence its citizens, rather than become a forum that can influence the government. 
As the definition of democracy is popular control over public affairs based on equality, 
none of the abovementioned elements succeeds in promoting democracy.  
The third and final part of the framework dealt with external relations and how 
that affected the democratisation process. The argument was that ‘relations’ was more 
accurate than just to focus on foreign policy. Eritrea’s relations are affected by a 
worldview where it does not trust anyone. This is partly due to the international 
community’s failure to sufficiently support Eritrea throughout history, partly due to the 
poor relationship they have with Ethiopia, and partly due to the EPLF/PFDJ’s military 
mentality. This thesis used Iyob’s term ‘diasporic’ to explain how the Eritrean 
government does not trust anyone and as a consequence perceives anyone who 
conditionally supports its policies as adversarial. Moreover, the international 
community’s unconditional support and high praises of ushered a lack of 
accountability by the recently liberated state. The EPLF/PFDJ thus had no pressure to 
revise its strategies and tactics.  
Construed, perceived or actual threats to the national project have had several 
consequences for the democratisation process. First, in the eyes of Isaias, the 
government’s legitimacy, which stemmed from the liberation war and its core value, 
was challenged after the second war with Ethiopia. In order to re-impose control and 
rebuild its legitimacy it was made clear that no alternative voices were tolerated. In 
other words, the PFDJ and its leaders’ core value was the major reason for its 
legitimacy, and when these were at risk, the very existence of its idea of Eritrea was at 
risk. Hence, all grievances that did not correspond with the government’s core value 
were perceived as being a threat to the state. Second, in order to make sure that the 
‘Eritreaness’ was upheld and outside influences was ignored, the government project 
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of national service has militarised the Eritrean society. This can be seen as a means to 
strengthen Eritrean defence against external invasion, but is also a means to enforce 
control over the Eritrean citizens. 
The three elements analysed in this study are intertwined. The state’s and the 
society’s analysis show two factors that are always interacting with each other: the 
state’s actions and the society’s response and vice versa. Furthermore, the term 
external relations implies a relationship where foreign forces and the domestic forces 
reacts to each other. In the domestic forces’ reactions, elements of the state and society 
are present. The lack of holding the government accountable by both the Eritrean 
society and the international community at the time of independence furthermore gave 
the PFDJ no incentive or pressure to transform into a civilian democratic party. The 
similarities between the liberation front and the political party in Eritrea were present 
already at the time of independence. Hence, the failure to democratise started already 
at independence, and not after the second war with Ethiopia with the 2001 crackdown. 
A democratisation process is a long, dynamic and complicated process where these 
three factors interact with each other and influence the democratic development. Based 
on the findings, the remainder of this chapter will now discuss some theoretical 
implications of the research. 
6.2 Theoretical Implications 
 This study has argued that a theoretical challenge is to theorise how the 
different factors interplay in the democratisation process. As a result, an eclectic 
framework was adopted using three analytical dimensions. The framework is first and 
foremost based on transition theory and historical sociology. In addition, it is based on 
post-conflict democratisation theory. The framework has paid additional attention to 
the decisions made in the immediate transition phase. It has used the influence from 
the transition theory to focus on actors and their choices. Nevertheless, actors’ choices 
are not made in a vacuum of other factors influencing the actor. Historical sociology 
emphasises the structures created by history through for instance war. Taken together, 
these two theories can create a good explanatory framework for analysing actors and 
the structures affecting the relevant actors.  
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 The alternative framework created for this research has analysed the state, 
society and external relations in a historical sociological perspective and has showed 
that in order to understand why democratisation in Eritrea has failed, one needs to 
analyse the relevant agents by looking at how history has shaped both their mentality, 
and created structures, which are not compatible with democratic development. The 
analysis of the state has showed that in order to understand the government and its 
leaders today, one needs to go back to the liberation war. The analysis of the different 
agents in the Eritrean society shows a similar pattern where old socio-cultural 
characteristics and the liberation war has created conditions not favourable for a 
strong, independent society and civil society working to hold their leaders accountable. 
Finally, Eritrea’s external relations today are a result of decades of decisions and 
violence between Eritrea and outside forces, which again has affected the 
democratisation process in Eritrea.  
 Additionally, reviewing the different theories within the post-conflict 
democratisation paradigm, it is clear that neither sequentialism nor gradualism give a 
sufficient explanation of the decisions made after a transition. Whereas these two 
focus on building institutions, the drafting and ratification of a constitution and 
creating a strong state, which can create favourable conditions for democratic 
development, this study has showed that the result can be otherwise. The Eritrean 
government has been skilful in being perceived as building well-functioning 
institutions, but it has not promoted democratic development. The government controls 
legal and administrative institutions and anyone making decisions that do not coincide 
with the leadership are removed from their post. If necessary elements, like the 
abovementioned institutions, of democracy are not included in democratisation 
processes but deemed external preconditions, they are by definition but non-
democratic enlightened ways to generate them.298 In other words, if the Eritrean 
government believes that institutions are important preconditions for democracy, but 
are only controlled by the PFDJ leadership, these institutions are non-democratic. The 
government has failed to facilitate popular capacity building, popular organisation 
building and a government that is ready to dedicate itself to facilitating popular 
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representation. In order to analyse the post-conflict transition phase, one has to look at 
how the government has focused facilitating popular representation and capacity 
building, not how well the institutions are built.  
 In other words, in order to understand and explain the failed democratisation 
process in Eritrea, one needs to adopt this type of framework. It has a strong 
explanatory dimension and deals with the complexity of a democratisation process. 
Nevertheless, this framework is not static. It fits the study of the period 1991-2011, but 
in the future new factors may change the situation in Eritrea. Eritrea is a young country 
and is still undergoing transition and the framework used here has been a useful model 
in explaining the transition phase so far. A theoretical framework needs to fit the 
empirical realities on the ground and as the world is changing, new factors may play a 
larger role. This framework has been adapted to the 20-year timeframe based on the 
historical experiences of the Horn of Africa. But in the future, new realities may create 
the need for a new framework dealing with other factors. 
In this study, the modernisation theory has been considered less relevant, as the 
argument has been that the lack of economic development has been the result of non-
democratic policies in Eritrea, not the other way around. However, as the Eritrean 
government has found large areas of gold and quartz299, the latter used for mobile 
phones and being very rare, the economic situation may change in the country. This 
can further create new ways of analysing political development in Eritrea. Another 
element that can alter the situation in Eritrea is Ethiopia. As has been mentioned in the 
thesis, Ethiopia has at the time of writing adopted a more aggressive rhetoric towards 
Eritrea. Another large-scale conflict between the two countries can create new factors 
that will be vital in order to understand political development in Eritrea.  
One can also identify a few wider implications of this study. First, as this study 
has shown, the case of Eritrea is by no means unique. While there of course are some 
unique factors, the fact that Eritrea gained its independence as a result of liberation 
war puts it in league with other non-democratic states, like Zimbabwe, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia and Angola. Many of the political parties that came to rule African states 
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were originally constituted as liberation movements.300 The need to have actors that 
can hold a liberation movement accountable when it assumes power is thus imperative. 
This is the second wider implication. The international community’s unconditional 
support at the time of independence gave the EPLF free reins to govern. In a situation 
like Eritrea in the beginning of 1991, there were no autonomous civil society, and it 
was thus imperative that a powerful international community could hold the new 
government consisting of liberation fighters, not politicians, accountable. The ‘African 
renaissance’ that President Clinton talked about did not only include Eritrea, but also 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda. These were all countries that received unconditional 
support from the international community at the beginning of the 1990s, but all with 
democratic deficiencies today. Moreover, while it is not useful to compare the current 
situation in North Africa and the Middle East with the case of Eritrea, a prolonged 
civil war in Libya for instance can bring the abovementioned elements into actuality 
again. What if the insurgents assume power in Libya? How should the international 
community support a new government? Another case, where these questions have 
some relevance is in South Sudan. In any case, this framework can have certain 
validity in other cases in Africa where a liberation movement assumed power. It deals 
with three significant analytical dimensions in a historical perspective that can give a 
more comprehensive picture of how countries like Zimbabwe and Uganda has failed to 
develop democratically. 
Eritrea today, however, is a result of historical realities that have affected agents 
on all levels to create a totalitarian state, devoid of democratic development. The PFDJ 
has failed to transform into a civilian democratic party and has used the 20-year period 
of independence as a continuation of the liberation war. Similar patterns are identified 
within the society as well as the last analytical dimension, external relations. As a 
statement by Eritrean Catholic bishops accurately put it, ‘If we have learned anything 
from history, it is the fact that we failed to draw lessons from it’.301 More or less, 
Eritrea’s 20 years of independence can be summarised in five simple words: Old sins 
cast long shadows.  
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